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LEGAL REFORM IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE: ANALYSIS 
AND CRITIQUE OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND 
OPERATION OF S. 487, THE TECHNOLOGY, 
EDUCATION AND COPYRIGHT 
HARMONIZATION (TEACH) ACT OF 2001 
Tomas A. Lipinski* 
This article presents an overview of current copyright law 
as it applies to distance education as articulated in Section 110 
of the Copyright Act, 1 and an assessment of recent legislation 
reforming that law. This article does not discuss the 
application of other provisions of the copyright law to distance 
education, such as fair use (section 107), service provider 
liability limitation (section 512(e)), or other legal issues 
regarding the provision of distance education. 
BACKGROUND: UNFINISHED BUSINESS FROM THE DMCA 
(DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT) 
Recent and major reform to existing copyright law is found 
in the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) of 1998.2 The DMCA contains the online service 
provider "immunity" provisions (actually a liability limitation 
as opposed to true immunity) of section 512 and the infamous 
* Tomas A. Lipinski, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor and Co-Director of 
the Center for Information Policy Research, School of Information Studies, University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He received his law degree form Marquette University Law 
School, his master of law (LL.M.) from John Marshall Law School, and his doctorate 
from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He researches, teaches, pub-
lishes, and speaks widely on the issues of information and Internet law and policy, in-
cluding copyright. His recent publication, entitled Librarian's Guide to Copyright for 
Shared and Networked Resources, was published in January/February 2002 as part of 
the American Library Association TechSource Library Technology Report Series. 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, statute references are to sections of the copyright 
law, Title 17 of the United States Code. 
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
CDMCA)). 
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anti-trafficking and anti-circumventing rules of section 1201.3 
Congress accomplished much with the DMCA, but its attempt 
at copyright modernization was still incomplete. Perhaps 
because the divergent views of stakeholders-copyright owners 
like publishers versus copyright users like schools-could not 
be reconciled, or perhaps because Congress simply ran out of 
time, distance education reform, specifically amendment of § 
110(2), was left undone. 4 Section 110 contains a number of 
limitations on performance and display rights of copyright 
owners; one of its practical effects expands educators' ability to 
use copyrighted materials in the classroom without having to 
obtain permission or pay additional fees for what would 
otherwise be an unauthorized public performance and display 
of the copyrighted work. This fact did not go unnoticed by the 
legislature. In the DMCA, Congress specifically instructed the 
U.S. Register of Copyrights to assess the current viewpoints of 
stakeholders, analyze the options, and make recommendations 
for legislative reform within six months after the date of 
enactment, 5 which is encapsulated in The Copyright Office 
Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education.6 
The sustained effort of distance education reform advocates 
has reached fruition. Reform to 17 U.S.C. § 110(2), the 
Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) 
Act of2002 
3. For a thorough and critical review of Sections 512 and 1201, see Jay Dratler, 
Jr. Cyberlaw: Intellectual Property in the Digital Millennium (L.,J. Press 2002). For a 
brief review, see Tomas A. Lipinski, Legal Issues in Web-Based Distance Education, in 
Handbook of American Distance Education (Michael G. Moore & William G. Anderson, 
eds., forthcoming, Mar. 2003). 
4. See also Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 5 (June 5, 2001) ("In the five years leading up to 
the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998, the application 
of copyright law to distance education using digital technologies was the subject of pub-
lic debate and attention in the United States. Extensive discussion concerning the is-
sue was conducted during Congress' consideration of the DMCA, but no conclusion was 
reached." (footnote omitted)). 
5. See DMCA, section 403 ("Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Register of Copyrights, after consultation with representatives of copy-
right owners, nonprofit educational institutions, and nonprofit libraries and archives, 
shall submit to the Congress recommendations on how to promote distance education 
through digital technologies, including interactive digital networks, while maintaining 
an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright owners and the needs of users 
of copyrighted works. Such recommendations shall include any legislation the Re!,rister 
of Copyrights considers appropriate to achieve the objective described in the preceding 
sentence."). 
6. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. 
Hrg., 106-539 U.S. Copy. Off. 96 (Comm. on the Jud. May 25, 1999). 
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updates the distance education provision of the 
Copyright Act for the 21st Century. The Act allows 
students and teachers to benefit from deployment in 
education of advanced digital transmission technologies 
like the Internet, while introducing safeguards to limit 
the additional risks to copyright owners that are 
inherent in exploiting works in digital format. 7 
97 
The TEACH Act passed in the Senate on June 6, 2001, and 
was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on June 
13, 2001. The House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property approved the bill for full committee 
action on July 11 and was reported by the House Committee on 
the Judiciary on September 25. TEACH eventually became 
part of H.R. 2215, the 21"1 Century Department of Justice 
Appropriations Authorization Act, and was signed into law by 
President George W. Bush on November 2, 2002.8 
This article analyzes and critiques the TEACH Act. The 
changes contemplated by TEACH represent a drastic departure 
from 17 U.S.C § 110(2) as it existed under previous law. 
TEACH requires educational institutions to meet new 
standards and continues to perpetuate a somewhat "lesser 
citizen" status to educators and students in distance education 
environments. 
THE PRIOR (LEGAL) CLIMATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION: 
UNDERSTANDING "THE OLD" 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) 
Laws written before digital and Internet media permeated 
classrooms hamper schools' efforts to increase classroom and 
instructional technology. Through new technologies, teachers 
and students can interact with sound and motion (video), in 
addition to complex graphical interfaces, both synchronously 
and asynchronously without ever leaving home or office. 
However, this type of teaching, just like, if not more than, 
traditional modes of face-to-face instruction, often raises issues 
of copyright law. Under§ 107 ofthe copyright law, a concept of 
fair use generally applies to uses of copyrighted works in 
educational settings, but it is not determinative of whether the 
use is ultimately fair or not. There are four fair use factors 
7. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 3 (June 5, 2001). 
8. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301. 
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that must be balanced to determine whether a particular use of 
a copyrighted work is a fair use under section 107 of copyright 
law,9 and the educational purpose of the use is just one of those 
factors. In other words, every educational use of copyrighted 
material is not automatically a fair use of that work under the 
law. In fact, when passing the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress 
explicitly rejected this construction. 10 When virtual outreach 
involves formal instructional services that incorporate the use 
of, and access to, copyrighted works, other sections of the 
copyright law are sought for additional "use" rights beyond 
those of the § 107 "fair use" grant. 11 Anytime a teaching 
interaction is broadcast to students at a remote location or 
transmitted via Web technology to a distributed or virtual 
classroom (or even used in front of a live classroom), it is likely 
that the public performance and display right of the copyright 
owner is implicated. Copyrights are implicated when a portion 
of text, a map, a chart, an article from a periodical, or any other 
visual aid is displayed, or when a work is performed (e.g., a 
video clip shown or a portion of a work read aloud). In 
educational settings, section 110(2) provides for the grant of 
additional "use" (public performance or display) rights. 12 
TEACH is a responsive piece of legislation, and "the ability 
of the United States to meet its domestic and international 
9. The text of section 107 is as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tions 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduc-
tion in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In de-
termining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the fac-
tors to be considered shall include-- (1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is un-
published shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consid-
eration of all the above factors. See also John W Hazard Jr., Copyright Law in Busi-
ness and Practice, 'li 8.01-8.03, at 8-2-8-75 (Prentice Hall 2000). 
10. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, (Sept. 3, 1976) (Reprinted in U.S. Copyright Office Circu-
lar 21: Reproduction of Copyrighted works by Educators and Librarians, 7 (1993). 
("The Committee also adheres to its earlier conclusion, that a specific exemption free-
ing certain reproductions of copyrighted works for educational and scholarly purposes 
from copyright control is not justified."). 
11. Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First 
Century, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 618 (2001); Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance Educa-
tion and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the Culture of 
Higher Education, 16 Touro L. R. 981, 1007 (2000). 
12. 17 u.s.c. § 110(2) 
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challenges and responsibilities is directly dependent on its 
educational capacity."13 TEACH demonstrates the need to 
think "beyond the box" of institutional education, in terms of 
students ("lifelong learning"), place ("in the workplace, at 
home"), and time ("at times selected by students to meet their 
needs"). 14 To understand the dramatic departure that TEACH 
represents, and why some advocate it is long overdue, this 
article discusses the structure of previous distance education 
law as expressed in 17 U.S.C. § 110(2). Additionally, this 
article discusses the contrast between the structure of distance 
education law and that of copyright law regarding public 
performance or display of materials in so-called live or 
traditional classroom settings (the law uses the phrase "face-to-
face teaching activities") under 17 U.S.C. § 110(1). By 
contrasting the current rights of educators in "live" class 
settings with those of their remote or distance education 
counterparts, an understanding of the claims of disparity and 
the perhaps incomplete rectification that TEACH promises is 
possible. 
17 U.S.C. § 110 provides certain categories ofusers, such as 
educators, with additional use rights for public performances 
and displays of copyrighted works. In general, the performance 
(e.g. reciting part of a play or showing a video), or display of 
material (e.g. hanging or holding up a map) in the school 
library media center, classroom, or on a Web site (e.g. 
broadcasting the recitation of the play, streaming the video 
over the Internet, or posting a digital copy of a map onto the 
class web site) requires permission from the copyright owner. 
A so-called public performance or display right would be 
needed, unless after considering the four § 107 factors (nature 
of the work, nature of the use, amount of the work used, and 
market impact of the use), the use is classified as a "fair use." 
17 U.S.C. § 110 was created to simplify the laborious and 
uncertain application of fair use. 
17 U.S.C. § 110 gives nonprofit educational institutions 
additional "use" rights. While the rights under § 110 apply to 
all performances and displays made during a teaching 
interaction, the right could also apply to school media centers 
or libraries if those places are used for "systematic 
instructional activities" within the school. These use rights are 
13. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 3. 
14. Id. at 4. 
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not given to other nonprofit libraries, such as public libraries 
that might engage in community targeted educational pursuits, 
nor are they given to educational institutions that are for-
profit, such as dance studios or language schools. As a result, 
17 U.S.C. § 110, at least with regard to subsections (1) and (2), 
is best characterized as an educator's provision, rather than a 
library provision. However, it might affect the school library or 
media center if the locale otherwise qualifies for § 110(2) 
performances or displays. 15 As discussed below,§ 110 would not 
apply to something like the playing of a Disney video to keep 
toddlers occupied while parents participate in the parent-
teacher conferences of older siblings. 
Unlike the three exclusive rights16-reproduction, 
preparation of derivative works, and distribution-the right of 
public performance applies only to specified categories of 
copyrighted material within the works of authorship range: 
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works; 
pantomimes, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works; 
and sound recordings. There is an exclusive right to perform 
sound recordings publicly but only if the performance is 
through a digital audio transmission. 17 Performance rights do 
15. See H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 
110 (1995), Historical and Statutory Notes). This expanded treatment is consistent 
with other discussion of the legislative history. For example, the use of the word 
"teacher" in the Classroom Guidelines is broad enough to cover school media specialist 
or school librarian. See Cong. Rec. Sll (Sept. 26, 1976). (Reprinted in: U.S. Copyright 
Office Circular 21: Reproduction of Copyrighted works by Educators and Librarians, 7 
(1993)("[T]he committee regards the concept of 'teacher' as broad enough to include in-
structional specialists working in consultation with actual instructors."). 
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
17. Section 106(6) covers the performance of sound recordings and provides for 
the exclusive right by the copyright owner to "perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). Sound recordings 
"are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, 
but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonore-
cords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). Sound recordings in es-
sence capture the rendering of an original expression, the presentation of a speech or 
lecture, the singing or playing of a musical work, or the reading of a text or other liter-
ary work. Unless the expression is completely ad lib or spontaneous, sound recordings 
are often based on a pre-existing work, and are therefore a form of derivative work. 
For example, a CD of Basil Rathbone reading a Sherlock Homes story is a sound re-
cording, and thus by its nature, derivative of a literary work, i.e., the original Arthur 
Conan Doyle tale. 
Under the 1976 Act there was no performance right in a sound recording. Be-
cause of this anomaly there is an increased chance of infringement of the underlying 
protected elements when a performance of a sound recording is made in a digital envi-
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ronment. (See S. Rep. No. 128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1995), reprinted in U.S. 
Cong.& Admin. News 356, 361 (1995)). In 1995 Congress passed the Digital Perform-
ance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA) (Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336-44 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 114, 115, 119, 801-803)) in order to stave the devel-
opment of digital delivery technologies from leading to widespread abuse and to grant 
to the copyright owners some control over the "ways in which their creative works are 
used." !d., at 357. As a result of DPRSRA, there is now a performance right in sound 
recordings, but only when the performance is done by means of a digital audio trans-
mission. Unfortunately, section 110, enacted in 1976 (years before the addition of the 
digital audio transmission amendment), was not one of the sections amended by 
DPRSRA. In other words the performance right granted to educators in existing section 
110(2) does not apply to sound recordings, but only to the underlying non-dramatic lit-
erary and musical work on which sound recordings might be based. However, 17 
U.S.C. § 114 contains significant exceptions to the DPRSA copyright owner's right and 
indicates that non-subscription "broadcast" digital transmissions of sound recordings 
are exempted outright. See 17 U.S. C. § 114(d)(l)(A). 
It could be argued that most "transmissions" a school would make are also not 
considered to be "broadcasts" for purposes of section 114 (the section which elucidates 
the nature of the DPRSA right), as qualifying broadcast transmissions pertain only to 
those transmissions "made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the 
Federal Communications Commission." 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3). See also, S. Rep. No. 128, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S. Gong. & Admin. News 356, 
366. ("Under this provision [section ll4(d)(l)(A)J, any transmission to members of the 
public that is neither a subscription transmission (as defined in section 114(j)(8)) nor 
part of an interactive service is exempt from the new digital performance right"). As a 
result, while some of the activities of an educational institution could conceivably qual-
ify (i.e., having a licensed broadcast station within its organizational structure), most 
would not. If it did have a broadcast service to facilitate distance learning and it was 
non-subscription (limited participants and paid), then the service would be exempted 
from the performance right under section 114(d)(l)(A). Moreover, if the transmission is 
a retransmission of a nonsubscription broadcast transmission, then section 
114(d)(l)(B)(iv) contains an exception for those circumstances where the "radio sta-
tion's broadcast transmission is made by a noncommercial educational broadcast sta-
tion ... " As a result, "(d]istance education activities that entail digital 'broadcast 
transmissions' of sound recordings will not be subject to the section 106(6) performance 
right." The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. 
Hrg., 106-539, 96 (U.S. Copy. Of( May 25, 1999). 
Second, subscription transmissions not exempt under (d)(l), e.g. a nonbroadcast 
transmission, and eligible nonsubscription transmissions are eligible for statutory li-
censing. While it might be tempting to hypothesize that most distance education 
transmission might be nonsubscription, a closer examination must be made. "Certain 
distance education activities could entail subscription transmissions (transmissions 
that are controlled and limited to particular recipients, and for which payment is re-
quired)." Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. 
Hrg., 106-539, 96 (U.S. Copy. Of( May 25, 1999).96 (1999) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)). It 
would appear that a distance education web class on music appreciation, for example, 
that has digital or digitized sound recordings available for students to stream and hear 
as part of the class, while not meeting the statutory definition of a broadcast, would 
nonetheless arguably be a subscription transmission under section 114(j)(14) defining 
subscription transmission as it "is controlled and limited to particular recipients [i.e., 
members of the class through password access as is typical on distance education web 
sites], and for which consideration is required to be paid or otherwise given by or on 
behalf of the recipients to receive the transmission or a package of transmissions in-
cluding the transmission" [i.e., student tuition payments]. Even if it is argued that the 
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not apply to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works because 
these must be displayed instead of performed. On the other 
hand, both performance and display rights govern literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographical works as well as 
pantomimes because they can be displayed and performed. 
Further, performance rights apply to motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works when images are shown sequentially, while 
display rights apply to works when the images are shown non-
sequentially or individually. Thus, the showing of a 
videocassette (either by broadcasting it to a remote class 
location, such as to students in a neighboring school district, or 
by converting it into digital format and loading it on a distance 
education class site that is accessed by students in multiple 
states) would not be authorized under pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2). These constitute "public performances of an audiovisual 
work," and as discussed below, performances under 110(2) were 
limited to non-dramatic literary or musical works. 
The § 106 rights of performance and display apply only to 
"public" performances and displays18• "To perform or display a 
work 'publicly' means to perform or display it at a place open to 
the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered."19 This is a location determinative 
transmission would be a nonsubscription transmission, in either case under section 
114(d)(2)(C) an "eligible nonsubscription transmission or a subscription transmission 
not exempt under paragraph (1)" may not publish advance play lists. If the music se-
lections are listed in the course syllabus, then either the eligible nonsubscription 
transmission or a subscription transmission not exempt under paragraph (1) cannot 
"cause to be published, or induce or facilitate the publication, by means of an advance 
program schedule or prior announcement, the titles of the specific sound recordings to 
be transmitted, the phonorecord embodying such sound recordings, or, other than for 
illustrative purposes, the names of the featured recording artists . . ." 17 U.S. C. § 
114(d)(2)(C)(ii). 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); What is the nature of the performance right? "To 'per-
form' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means 
of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to 
show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible." 17 
U.S.C. § 101. Other items in the classroom may be displayed: "To 'display' a work 
means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, 
or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, to show individual images nonsequentially." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Some categories of 
works can be performed, although others can only be displayed; you cannot perform a 
piece of sculpture, nor can you display a song. A performance in a classroom could be 
the showing of an episode from the HBO series "Band of Brothers," a reading of a chap-
ter from Great Gats by, or the singing of a Bernstein song. 
19. 17 U.S. C. § 101 (2002). 
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clause. The definition of "public" encompasses a wide range of 
classroom or educational settings. While a classroom may not 
necessarily be open to the public, it is still covered by the 
concept of public performance or display under the second 
"outside the normal circle of family or social acquaintances is 
gathered" proviso. It does not matter if the group of students in 
the classroom know each other, or if those gathered in the 
school library working on a project are socially acquainted with 
each other; the trigger is that the performance or display is 
made at a place open to the public or where people beyond the 
family or social acquaintances might gather. Students in a 
classroom or school library meet this definition. Any 
educational setting would, at the very least, qualify for the 
second proviso. Some school settings might also qualify for the 
first "place open to the public" proviso. A university library 
would surely meet this criterion, as might its classrooms, while 
a K-12 environs arguably might not. 20 However, in cases where 
a rural K-12 media center serves as a library for both the 
public school and the community at large, it becomes open to 
the public. 
17 U.S.C. § 110 governs public performances and displays 
of copyrighted materials in classroom and related settings. 
Although the mirroring of an instructor's material from live 
face-to-face settings into on-line settings (the educational "use" 
rights provided under § 110(1) and discussed below) is 
completely logical, the previous formulation of§ 110(2) did not 
20. The operative sub-clause of the "publicly" definition is triggered when the 
performance or display is transmitted or communicated to a place specified by the "lo-
cation clause" ("place open to the public" or "gathered"), however an additional trigger 
of "publicly" can be made by performances or displays "to the public, by means of any 
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the perform-
ance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time 
or at different times." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). This is an action (transmission or com-
munication) clause. Thus, if a school allows patrons to view videos in the cafeteria dur-
ing lunch period, it would trigger the location clause but not necessarily the action 
clause. However, if the school placed elevated television monitors in each corner of the 
main reading room, and allowed students to tune into MTV during a recreational read-
ing period, this would in theory trigger the action (transmission or communication) 
clause. This article discusses when under sections 110(1) or 110(2) such performance 
or displays might be allowed in educational settings. However, in the latter example, 
section 110(5) might still allow the public performance or display of such "transmis-
sions" (the television monitor in the reading area scenario), but a thorough discussion 
of the subsection is beyond the scope of this article. Of course it is the "transmission or 
communication" proviso that would make performances and displays of distance educa-
tion course content (students at home or at work in a virtual class) "public" in the sense 
of the copyright owner's section 106 rights. 
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appear to offer such flexibility. Moreover, by design, § 110(2) 
accomplished an opposite goal, often with harsh results. 
Pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) governed the use of 
copyrighted materials "by or in the course of a transmission," 
and by its simple terms applied to distance education 
environments. However, § 110(2) contained many practical 
limitations on the use of copyrighted material in the modern 
virtual Internet classroom. While the use of the word 
"transmission" could be interpreted broadly enough to apply to 
the dominant distance education web-based instruction today, 
the 1976 legislative history (House Report) entitled the 
discussion of § 110(2) with the words "Instructional 
Broadcasting." When the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, the 
operative vision of distance education was to have a class 
session in one location broadcast to students gathered in a 
classroom at another location. The language of § 110(2), 
unchanged since it was enacted in 1976, TEACH 
notwithstanding, belied the "stuck in time" nature of its many 
limitations. The most significant limitations are discussed 
below and are related to concepts of material or copyrighted 
works, institutional "systematic instructional activities," 
content integration, and location. 
First, the opening phrase of§ 110(2) limited the works that 
may be performed in a transmission to two categories: 
nondramatic literature (e.g. reading from a text) and music 
(e.g. singing a song). "Thus, the copyright owner's permission 
would be required for the performance on educational 
television or radio of a dramatic work, of a dramatic-musical 
work such as an opera or musical comedy, or of a motion 
picture.'m There was no limitation, however, on the display of 
a work.22 
There is no limitation on the category of works that may be 
displayed under 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2) by, or in the course of a 
transmission, but by definition, this right applies to a small 
23 
category of copyrighted works in the remote classroom. In 
21. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5697 (1995)). 
22. Performances are limited to "nondramatic literary or musical works" but no 
such limitation of categories of works exists under the plain text of pre-TEACH, the 
statute merely read: "or display of a work." 17 U.S. C. § 110(2) (2002). 
23. The copyright law recognizes eight categories of works: literary works, includ-
ing computer code; musical works including accompanying words; dramatic works, in-
cluding accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, 
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other words, certain works can, by legal operation as much as 
by logic, only be performed24 while others can only be 
displayed.25 For example, one cannot logically display a sound 
recording26 or perform a sculpture, but one can display a 
photograph or perform an audio-visual work such as a 
filmstrip. Thus, the limitation on the type of work used in the 
virtual classroom was just one of the hurdles in applying pre-
TEACH § 110(2) to distance education. While maps, charts 
and other visual teaching reinforcement tools could be used 
because they constitute displays, a video cannot be shown 
because it falls outside the section 110(2) performance 
category.27 
Second, the performance or display must be part of the 
"systematic instructional activities" of the nonprofit 
educational institution.28 For example, pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2) might not have supported the broadcast of copyrighted 
materials (performance or display) as part of a school's 
orientation activities or commencement exercises. The 
legislative history suggests the "concept of 'systematic 
and sculptural, so-called static-visual works; motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, so-called active visual works; sound recordings; and architectural works. 17 
U.S.C. § 102 (2002). 
24. Performance can apply to literary works; musical works; dramatic works; 
pantomimes and choreographic works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
and sound recordings. Limiting section 110(2) performances to nondramatic literary 
and musical works eliminates the majority of "performance oriented" works. "[F]or 
example, a performer could read a nondramatic literary work aloud under section 
110(2), but the copyright owner's permission would be required for him to act it out in 
dramatic form." IJ.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& 
Admin. News 5659, 5697 (1995)). 
25. Display can apply to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural and architectural 
works. 
26. In general, sound recordings have no performance right. You can always play 
a LP record, but the underlying music (musical work) of the composer remains pro-
tected, but of course, performance of a musical work was one of the rights granted by 
the pre-TEACH section 110(2) right. In addition, a sound recording has a performance 
right when the recording is performed by digital audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 
106(6). When Congress amended Section 106 in 1996, adding the performance right in 
sound recording via a digital audio transmission, it added a definition of digital audio 
transmission to mean "a transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other 
nonanalog format." This definition is not terribly helpful but "plausibly implicate[s] 
most of the major conduits by [which] Americans now receive information, including 
television and radio broadcast, telecommunications, cable and fiber optics, direct satel-
lite services, and even online interactive services." Hazard, supra n. 9, at 4-41. 
27. The only two categories of works that could be performed were "nondramtic 
literary or musical works" 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (2002). 
28. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(A) (2002). 
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instructional activities' is intended as the general equivalent of 
'curriculums,' but it could be broader in a case like that of an 
institution using systematic teaching methods not related to 
specific course work."29 This definition is unclear, but it could 
be interpreted to allow for the use (performance or display) of 
copyrighted material in the instruction of basic distance 
technologies that are not part of "specific course work." 
Perhaps transmitting web-based instructional technology, or 
transmitting an opening university orientation to remote 
campus locations or to distance students would have qualified 
under the previous § 110(2) performance and display right. The 
activities, if not within the actual curriculum of a course, would 
still to have been "in accordance with the pattern of teaching 
established by the governmental body or institution."30 Thus, it 
seems a performance or display of copyrighted material as part 
of an orientation or commencement would not be allowed and 
would require either permission from the copyright owner or 
the "purchase" of a specific performance or display right. 
Subsection 110(2)(B) also required that the "performance of 
a nondramatic literary or musical work or display of a work be 
directly related and of material assistance to the teaching 
content of the transmission."31 The legislative history of the 
1976 Act offers little assistance in understanding the second 
substantive requirement of § 110(2) found in § 110(2)(B). 
However, the 2001 legislative history of TEACH retains the 
110(2)(B) requirement using the same exact language and 
numerical-alpha statutory section designation. This suggests 
that 
[t]he requirement of subparagraph (2)(B), that the 
performance or display must be directly related and of 
material assistance to the teaching content of the 
transmission, is found in current law [referring to pre-
TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(B)], and has been retained in 
its current form [referring to TEACH provision 17 
U.S.C. § 110(2)(B)]. As noted in the Register's Report 
[footnote omitted], this test of relevance and materiality 
connects the copyrighted work to the curriculum, and it 
means that the portion performed or displayed may not 
be performed or displayed for the mere entertainment of 
29. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5697 (1995)). 
30. !d. 
31. 17 U.S. C. § 110(2)(B) (2002). 
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the students, or as unrelated background material. 32 
The 2001 legislative history of TEACH suggests the 
"directly related and of material assistance" clause in 17 U.S. C. 
§ 110(2)(B) is the language (whether 1976 or 2001 TEACH) 
that would prevent a teacher from performing a work for the 
"mere entertainment" of his or her students. The 1976 
legislative history does make reference to the disallowance of a 
classroom performance or display under § 110, if the purpose is 
for "recreation or entertainment."33 And that reference is made 
as an interpretation of the § 110(1) live classroom "face-to-face 
teaching activities" phrasing instead of in the discussion of the 
§ 110(2) remote student or distance education right. 
The "directly related and of material assistance" language 
of 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(B), enacted in 1976 but not explained 
until 2001, and the "face-to-face teaching activities" of the 1976 
enacted § 110(1) both prevent entertainment uses of 
copyrighted material in the classroom without permission. As 
a result of this recent clarification, the 1976 legislative history 
interprets § 110(1) as prohibiting performances or displays 
"that are given for the recreation or entertainment of any part 
of their audience," while the 2001 TEACH legislative history 
makes a similar assertion by saying that performances and 
plays "may not be performed or displayed for the mere 
entertainment of the students or as unrelated background 
material" for§ 110(2). 
Moreover, as the 1976 legislative history makes the 
relevance and materiality requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) 
implicit in § 110(1) by interpreting its "teaching activities" 
language to exclude recreational or entertainment use of 
material, the legislative history of TEACH explicitly makes 
clear that the "directly related and of material assistance" 
language of§ 110(2) also excludes material for the purposes of 
"entertainment" or "unrelated background material."34 As a 
result, the "teaching activities" and "directly related and of 
material assistance" phrases accomplish the same or similar 
entertainment use restriction but use different statutory 
32. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001) (italics added). 
33. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5695 (1995)) ("but they do not included performances or displays, whatever 
their cultural value or intellectual appeal, that are given for the recreation or enter-
tainment of any part of their audience."). 
34. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001). 
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language.:35 
While it is obvious that 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) cannot by 
operation apply to live on-site teaching because it targets 
performances or displays by or in the course of a transmission, 
the § 110(1) phrasing of "teaching activities" did not appear 
anywhere in the pre-TEACH section 110(2) or in the version of 
110(2) enacted under TEACH. The section 110(2) relevance 
("directly related") and materiality ("and of material assistance 
to the teaching content") requirement should by logic apply to 
any performance or display of copyrighted material in the 
classroom, including distance scenarios. Under § 110(2), 
however, only the legislative history of TEACH makes the 
requirement explicit (at least as far as a Senate or House 
Committee Report can make it so). 36 
The impact of the TEACH legislative history may stretch 
beyond the 2001 amendment. The commentary may suggest a 
slight re-interpretation of the 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) "recreation or 
entertainment" prohibition for live ("face-to-face) students 
under § 110(1). Since these uses were disallowed under the 
1976 legislative history, and since the 2001 legislative history 
language in § 110(2)(B) also prohibits such uses in distance 
settings, the explanation provided in the recent 2001 
commentary regarding the general nature of the "mere 
entertainment" prohibition might further expand the 
application of its similar prohibition vis-a-vis § 110(1). In other 
words, the committee discussion in 2001 can be used to further 
interpret the intent of the 1976 commentary prohibiting 
similar unnecessary performances and displays. If this is true, 
the § 110(1) prohibition (like the § 110(2)(B) prohibition as 
indicated by the TEACH legislative history) might also prohibit 
35. The "teaching activities" language of section 110(1) enacted in 1976 is inter-
preted to mean that the performance and display right granted by section110(1) do not 
apply to those uses "whatever their cultural value or intellectual appeal, that are given 
for the recreation or entertainment of any part of their audience."). H.R. Rpt. 94-14 76, 
at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 5659, 5695 (1995)). While 
the "directly related and of material assistance" phrasing used in pre-TEACH section 
110(2)(B), also enacted in 1976 and retained in TEACH section 110(2)(B) accomplish 
the same or similar entertainment use restriction but use different statutory language 
to do so. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001) ("the portion performed or displayed 
may not be performed or displayed for the mere entertainment of the students, or as 
unrelated background material."). 
36. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, 10-11 (June 5, 2001). The House Report uses the same lan-
guage to describe the operation of TEACH section 110(2)(B). H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). 
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performances and displays of copyrighted works that qualify as 
"unrelated background material." 
Whether or not this additional prohibition ("unrelated 
background material") applies to § 110(1) uses as well as to § 
110(2)(B) uses requires an understanding of what "unrelated 
background material" might be. Might it prohibit the posting of 
a background article to the class, which is analogous to a 
teacher passing around an article during a face-to-face 
encounter with students? Would a junior high school class 
studying To Kill a Mockingbird be allowed to view (display) 
ornithological material on mockingbirds because it qualifies as 
related background material, while similar material on poverty 
in a rural southern town or on a recipe for corn bread might not 
be allowed because it is unrelated background material? 
Defining unrelated background material becomes difficult. 
Does "unrelated" modify "background," or is the phrasing 
redundant, making the statute exclude unrelated material that 
is only background in nature (in which case both postings 
might be excluded)? 
Arguably, "related" as opposed to "unrelated" background 
material could still be acceptable under the TEACH Senate and 
House Committee Reports. If so, what is the point of the 
phrase "background material?" When does background 
material, which by definition always seems to have relevance 
to the curriculum, move from an unacceptable "unrelated" 
category to an acceptable "related" category? Would use of 
material on the European Holocaust in a World War II unit be 
related background material, while the use of material on the 
Armenian or Kurdish genocide be unrelated background 
material? The interpretation would be more precise if either 
the prohibition material included "unrelated material" alone or 
the TEACH § 110(2) right was more restrictive by prohibiting § 
110(2) from applying to all "background material." Excluding 
"unrelated background material" appears to accomplish 
nothing more than confusion. 
Finally, under the pre-TEACH language of§ 110(2)(C), it is 
unclear whether the rights granted to educators in § 110(2) 
allowed the transmission over the Internet of a performance or 
display of copyrighted material under the most prevalent one-
to-one distance education model (that is, remote broadcast to 
individual students at separate locations, via home or work 
computers). The traditional one-to-many mode broadcast model 
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is reflected by the 1976 formulation of§ 110(2) and operates as 
a significant limitation in many current distance education 
scenarios. Yet this contrasts with the wide range of rights an 
educator has in a live class under § 110(1), which are discussed 
below. 
Pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(c) indicated that a 
qualifying transmission must be made "primarily" to only one 
of three categories of locations or persons. First, and of most 
relevance to the present discussion, pre-TEACH § 110(2)(C)(i) 
indicated that the reception must be made primarily for 
"reception in the classroom or similar places normally devoted 
to instruction." Pre-TEACH § 110(2)(C)(ii) and (iii) allowed 
transmissions to those with disabilities or government 
employees who cannot physically attend class. 37 
Under pre-TEACH 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(C), factors 
determining whether the purpose of a transmission were 
"primarily" for one of the permissible designated groups 
include: 1) traditional classroom students, 2) disabled or other 
special student groups such as preschool children, displaced 
workers, illiterates, and shut-ins, or 3) government employees 
as part of a training exercise-include "subject matter, content 
and the time" of the transmission.38 That the public at large 
might also be able to receive the transmission does not 
disqualify its use under the Section 110(2) exemption. 
The 1976 legislative history suggests the purpose behind 
the initial transmission is the determining factor. For 
example, what if the transmission is made for regular students 
or disabled learners, but the mode of technology allows others 
to also pick up the transmission? That others might intercept 
the transmission is acceptable and the performance or display 
of qualifying copyrighted materials is allowed. However, a 
transmission made for the public at large, where the 
educational institution intends to piggyback or incorporate the 
broadcast into its curriculum, is not allowed. For instance, an 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (1995) (under (ii) to "persons to whom the trans-
mission is directed because their disabilities or other special circumstances prevent 
their attendance in classrooms or similar places normally devoted to instruction" or 
third under (iii) to "officers or employees of governmental bodies as a part of their offi-
cial duties or employment"). 
38. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5697-98 (1995)) ("Factors to consider in determining the 'primary' purpose 
of a program would include its subject matter, content, and the time of its transmis-
sion."). 
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educational fire safety program produced under the pre-
TEACH § 110(2) rules by the local fire department and 
broadcast on the local access cable channel that includes a 
segment of firefighters singing a rendition of the Talking 
Heads "Burning Down the House" (performance of a musical 
work) would not be acceptable. In the latter case, that some 
people in the qualifying group (children at the local public 
school as part of a public safety class) can receive the 
transmission will not save the broadcaster from liability. The 
firefighters either have to seek permission to sing the song (as 
it does not qualify for the § 110(2) right), argue that fair use 
allows the performance of the song, or seek permission from 
the copyright owner. However, the legislative history makes 
clear that "instructional television college credit courses ... 
aimed at undergraduate and graduate students in earnest 
pursuit of higher educational degrees [qualify as long as] these 
broadcasts are aimed at regularly enrolled students and are 
conducted by recognized higher education institutions."39 Again, 
the 1976 Act envisioned the world of distance education in the 
traditional broadcast mode. While the traditional broadcast 
mode is still in use and not completely outdated, broadcast is 
disappearing quickly. 
Were transmissions to students in the contemporary 
distance education model, a model that anticipates that most 
students access the material from their personal computer 
stations at home or the office, included in the pre-TEACH § 
110(2)(C)(i) "primarily" requirement? No. The plain language 
of § 110(2) did not allow use of the one-to-one transmission 
mode. Although the transmission needs only to be made 
primarily in "classrooms or similar places normally devoted to 
instruction," did this requirement offer enough legal breathing 
room for participants and instructors in the contemporary one-
to-one distance education model, or does this limitation 
prohibit transmission to distance students at home or at work? 
Pre-TEACH section 110(2) apparently prohibited transmissions 
to the students at home or working, since the transmission is 
not primarily to a classroom or similar place normally devoted 
to instruction. While a bedroom or office might be the only 
place (or at least the primary place) where a particular 
distance student of the twenty-first century receives his or her 
:39. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 84 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5698 (1995)) . 
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remote instruction, the bedroom or office unfortunately is not a 
"classroom" nor is it "a place normally devoted to" that 
instruction. Because the 1976 formulation of§ 110(2) required 
that transmission be made primarily for "receptions in 
classrooms or similar places normally devoted to instruction," a 
school could broadcast a performance of a literary work to 
another school as part of a team-taught course, but it could not 
broadcast the performance to students who take the course 
from home. This standard of the traditional classroom is an 
objective standard, not one based on the subjective concept of 
the virtual student. The inability to apply § 110(2) to the 
typical distance education session prompted many to call for 
legislative reform. As a result of these limitations, efforts to 
amend the subsection to allow for an expansion of the 
categories of § 110(2) works available for performance and 
display in the classroom and an expansion of the places where 
such receptions can be received continued.40 
Finally, although 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) requires that "in that 
case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work" the 
performance or display must be made by means of a copy that 
was lawfully made (see discussion below), no such language 
appears in the current version of § 110(2). The § 110(1) 
"unlawfully made" copy proviso is triggered when the "person 
responsible for the performance knew or had reason to believe" 
the version of the work used was an unlawfully made copy. 
The lack of this specific requirement in pre-TEACH § 110(2) 
might tempt one to conclude that if the chapters from a book 
that were first reproduced (digitized) by the school before it 
was transmitted (displayed) to distance students exceeded fair 
use (and was not otherwise a lawful copy) and the instructor 
suspected the use was unlawful, it would not matter for 
purposes of § 110(2) applicability because § 110(2) does not 
contain such restricting language. It follows that an instructor 
could use an unlawful and infringing copy (under § 107, one 
that exceeds fair use, for example) of a work to undertake a 
lawful display to remote students under § 110(2). This result 
seems odd and, as explained in' the discussion of TEACH below, 
was unintended. More likely, Congress simply did not 
anticipate the current state of distance education where digital 
is common and thus where the likelihood of appropriating an 
40. Sen. Jud. Comm., The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Dis-
tance Education, Sen. Hrg., 106-539, 106" Cong. 140-70 (May 25, 1999). 
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infringing copy for educational use is also more common and 
wrote the language of § 110(2) when distance education 
consisted of remote television broadcasting and no need existed 
to convert most works into digital format for transmission to 
remote students. 
SECOND CLASS CITIZENS: VIEWING 17 U.S. C. § 110(2) IN 
CONTRAST TO THE RIGHTS AFFORDED FACE-TO-FACE TEACHING 
UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) AND PRIOR LAW 
Section 110(1) provides that the following are not infringing 
activities: 
the performance or display of a work by instructors or 
pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of 
a nonprofit educational institution, in a classroom, or 
similar place devoted to instruction, unless, in the case 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the 
performance, or the display of individual images, is 
given by means of a copy that was not lawfully made 
under this title, and that the person responsible for the 
performance knew or had reason to believe was not 
lawfully made.41 
Several points should be made regarding the provisions of 
this subsection: the who, what, and where of its requirements, 
the allowance given to educators in "live, face-to-face settings" 
by implication, and the advantage that students in live 
classrooms have over their distance or remote counterparts. 
First, regarding the "who," the performance or display in 
subsection (1) must be made by instructors or pupils and 
cannot be done by guest performers or students not enrolled in 
the class. But the legislative history suggests that a guest 
lecturer is covered by the exception and may perform or display 
works consistent with the section's other conditions.42 
The major limitation that§ 110(1) does impose on educators 
in "live" class settings is tied to the statutory language 
requiring that qualifying performances and displays occur 
within the context "of face-to-face teaching activities of a 
nonprofit educational institution, in a classroom or similar 
41. 17 U.S. C. § 110(1) (1995). 
42. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 82 (Sept 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5696 (1995)) ("However, the term 'instructors' would be broad enough to 
include guest lecturers if their instructional activities remain confined to classroom 
activities. In general, the term 'pupils' refers to the enrolled members of a class."). 
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place devoted to instruction." Remote broadcasts are not 
allowed (but are covered by § 110 (2), but as long as the 
instructor and pupil are in the same building or general area, 
even though the performance might be "broadcast" via in-
house, closed-circuit television, the exemption applies. This 
example allows for a transmission of material from one room to 
another because all the students may not physically fit into the 
same lecture hall to be covered by § 110(1), which is not the 
true "distance" transmission contemplated by § 110(2). This 
"where" requirement suggests that the §110(1) right is tied to 
the traditional notion of the physical classroom versus the 
wider school environment. For example, performance of a 
copyrighted work at a school-wide assembly is not allowed 
because this performance is not made in a classroom or similar 
place devoted to instruction, although this situation might 
conceivably be covered by § 110 (4). The 1976 legislative 
history offers that the concept of face-to-face "embrace[s] 
instructional performances and displays" as long as they are 
not transmitted. However, the "concept does not require that 
the teacher and the students be able to see each other, 
although it does require their simultaneous presence in the 
same general place."43 Same building or general area would 
apply; for example, where a closed circuit transmission is used 
to "beam" the class session from the main lecture room to 
students gathered in adjoining or satellite rooms on other floors 
in the same building and at the same time is permitted. 
Finally, the "what" indicates that the§ 110(1) exemption to 
the performance and display right of copyright owner's applies 
to any type of work, be it text, audio, video, etc. This is one 
instance where comparing the rights of educators in front of 
live students (live face-to-face performances or displays under§ 
110(1)) versus educators in distance education settings 
(performances or displays by means of a transmission under § 
110(2)), the law favors the "use" rights of "live" teachers and 
their students over those teachers and students in remote or 
distance settings. This disparity is the main impetus behind 
the legislative reform of§ 110(2) in TEACH. Under the current 
law and as discussed above, transmissions of performances 
under§ 110(2) are limited to nondramatic literary and musical 
works. Thus, a teacher under pre-TEACH§ 110(2) could read a 
text or sing a song but could not show a video (an audiovisual 
43. !d. at 81. 
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work) to distance students. That teacher's "live" instructional 
counterpart, who teaches a similar course to an in-person, on-
campus class and uses the same material, would face no such 
limitation; the video tape (as long as it is a lawfully made copy) 
could be shown to students gathered in a campus classroom. 
This is the practical result of the broad grant of rights provided 
to educators under § 110(1). 
Consider a potential additional limitation on distance 
educators. Recall that there is no performance right in a sound 
recording and that the § 110(1) right applies to any category of 
copyrighted material. Thus, in a 'live" class, a copyrighted 
work like a sound recording (even in digital form, like a music 
CD) could be performed, as that work has no "performance" 
right associated with it. Also recall the amendment to § 106(6) 
that created a performance right in digital audio transmissions 
of sound recordings. Combine this fact with the reality that 
arguably all transmissions of web-based distance instruction 
would be digital,44 and the distance classroom is again short-
changed in the pre-TEACH environment, and perhaps under 
TEACH as well. Because § 110(1) applies to any category of 
work, permissible performances include the playing of an LP or 
music CD to a live class. Performance of the underlying 
musical work is also covered because there is no limitation on 
the category of works used. Nor does performance of the sound 
recording necessitate any § 110(1) right, as the performance 
right in a sound recording is only applicable when the 
performance is made by means of a digital audio transmission. 
However, in a distance education setting, the acceptable use 
of the CD is far less clear and appears to be prohibited in the 
pre-TEACH setting. At the very least, it has to qualify for the 
complex licensing requirements under § 114(d): the use of 
underlying musical work in the CD is allowed under § 110(2), 
but the additional performance right under § 106(6) prevents 
its use as a digital audio transmission over the Internet as part 
of a web-based distance education course, as this would trigger 
the performance right of the recording artist. Since the § 110(2) 
right applies only to the underlying music and not to the 
performer's copyright in the sound recording of it, a 
performance right would now be needed to make digital audio 
transmission to remote students over the Internet possible. Of 
course, it could be argued that the creation of the performance 
44. i.e., a digital transmission over the Internet 
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right in a sound recording by means of a digital audio recording 
is focused entirely on prohibiting the broadcast of sound 
recordings as part of a pay-per-view equivalent of Internet-
based or other digital variations of the celestialjukebox.45 
The general exceptions in § 114(d), exclude a 
"nonsubscription broadcast transmission." Specific exceptions 
exclude retransmissions of noncommercial educational 
broadcast stations. 46 These provisions underscore the emphasis 
of the new performance right on those uses of sound recordings 
by digital modes that are more or less the equivalent of 
digitized radio stations. Furthermore, the definition of 
"broadcast" under § 114(j) is tied to those broadcasts by 
licensed Federal Communications Commissions authority. 
Whether a court would also adopt this narrow view of the right 
created is arguable as "the development of digital technology ... 
has blurred to distinction between broadcasting and 
distribution."47 Under§ 114, a performance could be subject to 
"no right at all, a statutory license, or a full exclusive right.'148 
Nonsubscription broadcast transmissions are exempted by the 
§ 106(6) performance right and statutory licenses are available 
from subscriptions transmissions, but interactive service 
transmissions are subject to the full exclusive right of§ 106(6). 
Arguably, most distance education transmissions would be 
subscription transmissions, as that concept is defined in § 
114(j)(14), i.e., "controlled and limited to particular recipients" 
and thus paid. So they could be subject to the statutory 
licensing requirements of§ 114(d)(2)(C). 
The "teaching activity" language in § 110(1) requires only 
45. See Dralter, supra n. 3, at§ 2.04, at 2-14-2-28.15. 
46. 17 U.S. C. § 114(d)(1)(B)(iv) (1995). 
47. Harzard, supra n. 9 at 4-57 (citing in footnote 11, William H. O'Dowd, The 
Need for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 249, 
257 (1993)). 
48. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, 
Sen. Hrg., 106-539, 106'" Cong., at 95-96 ("In its current form, section 114 divides the 
types of transmissions that carry performances of sound recordings into three catego-
ries. Depending on the category into which the digital audio transmission falls, the 
performance of the sound recording could be subject to no right at all, a statutory li-
cense, or a full exclusive right. The three categories of transmissions in section 114(d) 
are: (1) nonsubscription broadcast transmissions (and certain retransmissions), which 
are completely exempted from the section 106(6) performance right; (2) subscription 
transmissions and certain 'eligible nonsubscription transmissions' such as web casting, 
which are eligible for a statutory license, subject to a list of criteria; (3) interactive (on-
demand) transmissions and other non-exempt transmissions that do not qualify for the 
statutory license, which are subject to the full exclusive performance right."). 
95] LEGAL REFORM IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 117 
that the content of the material be related to the curriculum. 
Although showing the Hollywood film adaptation of "The Last 
Temptation of Christ" is relevant in a theology class, it would 
not be considered relevant if shown in a physics class as an 
end-of-semester reward. Teaching activities do not include 
performances or displays "whatever their cultural or 
recreational value or intellectual appeal, that are given for the 
recreation or entertainment of any part of their audience.'>~9 
Showing the same film to a theology class just to keep students 
occupied while the teacher is absent or otherwise occupied 
grading papers might not be acceptable, as the sense of 
"curriculum" suggests that the material performed or displayed 
must be integrated into the teaching session and coordinated 
with a specific teaching moment. 50 Thus, showing "Saving 
Private Ryan" during a unit on WWII without any other 
integration into the curriculum might not qualify. Moreover, it 
might be poor teaching, similar to a teacher bringing a helmet 
or other equipment soldiers used in the Normandy landings 
and just setting the items on the table without any other 
explanation or commentary. However, showing the film and 
then having students write a research paper comparing the 
historical accuracy of the film to actual events or compose a 
creative essay imagining what a particular a character from 
the movie might include in a letter home would arguably offer 
some integration of the film into the teaching or systematic 
instructional activities. 
Furthermore, the § 110(1) exemptions must be in a "bona 
fide" educational environment with students enrolled in a 
class. For example, showing a video to Spanish Club members 
even in a classroom or school meeting room or to toddlers in a 
49. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5695 (1995)). 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) ("performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils 
in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution .. 
. "). (4 I-LR. Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 
5659, 5695 (1995)) observes that "[t]he 'teaching activities' exempted by the clause en-
compasses systematic instruction of a very wide variety of subjects ... " and H.R. Rpt. 
94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976)(reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 5659, 5697 
(1995)) discussing section 110(2) defines "ft]he concept of 'systematic instructional ac-
tivities' is intended as the general equivalent of 'curriculums,' but it could be broader in 
a case such as that of an institution using systematic teaching methods not related to 
specific course work," but in no way does it extend to "performances or displays, what-
ever their cultural value or intellectual appeal, that are given for the recreation or en-
tertainment of any part of their audience." H.R Rpt. 94-1476, at 81 (Sept. 3, 1976)(re-
printed in U.S. Cong.& Admin. News 5659, 5695 (1995)). 
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day care does not qualifY because the audience is not comprised 
of students enrolled in a specific class. Showing a videocassette 
in a classroom as part of a community travel night, parents' 
organization, or school board meeting would not qualify 
either. 51 Moreover, the educational institution must be 
nonprofit.52 While it need not be accredited, this requirement is 
added for distance education settings under TEACH, as 
discussed below. 
Finally, § 110(1) excepts performances and displays where 
"in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the 
performance, or the display of individual images is given by 
means of a copy that was not lawfully made under this title, 
and that the person responsible for the performance knew or 
had reason to believe was not lawfully made." Although not 
targeted specifically at off-air tapings of programs recorded on 
a VCR at home or at school then used in the classroom, this 
language suggests that if, for instance, an off-air tape made 
five years ago or from a pay-for-view station (and thus far in 
excess of the 10-day viewing limitation for broadcast 
programming contained in the off-air taping guidelines)53 was 
shown, the§ 110(1) exemption would not apply to its use in the 
classroom, since it is not a lawful copy. Most educators should 
be aware ("knew or had reason to believe"54) that such use is far 
beyond the acceptable realm of§ 110 and 107, thus it is a "copy 
that was not lawfully made under this title." The "lawfully 
made" requirement applies only to audiovisual works, not the 
51. Although no court cases exist involving videocassette viewing, section 110, 
and classrooms, analogous precedent supports this distinction. In Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1986); and Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984), the viewing of videos by custom-
ers in a video store, even where the viewing is done privately, was held to be a public 
performance, because the store where the booths were located was public. On the other 
hand, the viewing of videodiscs in a hotel room by guests is not a public performance 
because hotel rooms, once rented for occupancy, are deemed private. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Prof Real Est. Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989). In contrast, a 
videotape system installed in hotel for remote operation by hotel guests for transmit-
ting selected videotapes for viewing on TVs in hotel rooms is public performance re-
quiring copyright license. 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) ("performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils 
in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution .. 
. "). 
53. Guidelines for Off-Air Recording o{ Broadcast Programming for Educational 
Purposes, reprinted in Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librari· 
ans, Circular 21, U.S. Copy. Off. 26 (U.S. Copy. Off. 1988). 
54. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) 
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remaining categories of works allowed to be performed or 
displayed under § 110(1). 
A NEW DAY FOR DISTANCE EDUCATION: THE TEACH 
REFORMULATION OF 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) 
As discussed earlier,55 pre-TEACH § 110(2) granted a 
teacher performance and display rights of "transmission" when 
using copyrighted works in nonprofit educational settings. The 
transmission performance right, however, applied only to two 
categories of works: nondramatic literary (text, such as a book 
or poetry reading) or musical works (singing a song). § 110(2) 
allows a faculty member to read from a Faulkner short story or 
an excerpt from a Toni Morrison novel and stream (transmit) 
the reading over the university's distance education technology. 
But if the same faculty member desired to let his or her 
distance students watch (load, stream, and view) a 
documentary about Faulkner or a theatrical movie version of a 
Morrison story, a performance right is needed. A performance 
right is also required for the transmission of a play or "opera or 
musical comedy or motion picture"56 since these are dramatic, 
dramatico-musical, or audiovisual works. Such a drastic and 
arbitrary difference in the application of an educator's ability to 
use copyrighted material in live versus distance education 
settings is one reason behind § 110(2) revision. Again, there 
was no such limitation with respect to the display of works. 
However, by definition of "display" and the nature of some 
copyrighted works, the wide reach of the § 110(2) display right 
can apply only to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and 
the text, score, or scripting of literary, musical, and 
choreographic-pantomime works. 57 
In contrast to these limitations, reform to § 110(2) by way of 
its reformulation in TEACH accomplishes much.58 According to 
55. See supra n. 13 and the following discussion. 
56. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5697 (1995)) ("Thus, the copyright owner's permission would be required 
for the performance on educational television or radio of a dramatic work, of a 
dramatico-musical work such as an opera or musical comedy, or of a motion picture."). 
57. "[l]n the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pan-
tomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of 
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly." 
17 U.S.C. § 106(5); See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (re: "display" lists); supra n.19. 
58. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301. 
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the Senate Committee Report on TEACH: 
The Act expands the exempted copyright rights, the 
types of transmissions, and the categories of works that 
the exemption covers beyond those that are covered by 
the existing exemption for performances and displays of 
certain copyrighted works in the course of instructional 
transmissions. Thus, for example, it allows 
transmissions to locations other than a physical 
classroom, and allows for performances of reasonable 
and limited portions of audiovisual works, sound 
recordings, and other works within the scope of the 
t . 59 exemp wn. 
The goal of the § 110(2) revision is to "remove[] the concept 
of the physical classroom."60 The reformulated TEACH version 
of section 110(2) is long and somewhat complex (compared to § 
110(1) and TEACH § 110(2)). Below is an analysis of its major 
provisions. 
First, TEASCH replaces the introductory applicable 
"performance" and "display" statement of § 110(2) with broad 
exclusory language regarding certain instructional material. 
This may not be the most effective way to establish a positive 
statutory tone of expanded user's rights. The prefatory clause 
of TEACH § 110(2) accepts all works that are "produced or 
marketed primarily for performance or display as part of 
mediated instructional activities transmitted via digital 
networks,"61 from the expanded performance and display right 
of TEACH § 110(2). By its plain meaning the provision "limits 
the relevant materials by excluding those primarily produced 
or marketed for the exempt activity."62 
Apparently this provision includes materials marketed 
primarily for use in distance teaching, i.e., the exempt activity. 
These materials are instructional by their intent, design, and 
sale. While this may seem to be an odd result, (that materials 
designed for use in the distance classroom are specifically 
excluded from what might be characterized as an educational 
rights provision), Congress was concerned that the expanded 
ability to incorporate copyrighted material into the distance 
59. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 4 (June 5, 2001). 
60. I d. at 7. 
61. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301. 
62. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 10 (June 5, 2001). 
95] LEGAL REFORM IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 121 
environment vis-a-vis a revised § 110(2) not be used to 
supplant existing market or industry for instructional 
materials. This limitation is "intended to prevent the 
exemption [granted by TEACH] from undermining the primary 
market for (and, therefore, impairing the incentive to create, 
modifY, or distribute) those materials whose primary market 
would otherwise fall within the scope of the exemption."63 Take 
the example of textbooks as does the TEACH Committee 
Report: "[B]ecause textbooks typically are not primarily 
produced or marketed for performance or display in a manner 
analogous to performances or display in the live classroom 
setting, they would not per se be excluded from the exemption 
under the exclusion in the opening clause."64 A teacher could, in 
a distance education environment, display several pages of 
graphs or charts from a textbook as the textbook is not 
"produced primarily for performance or display as part of 
mediated instructional activities."65 So, displays of textbooks, 
or at least limited portions of a textbook, are allowed. 
Second, the revised § 110(2) right would only apply to 
"accredited" nonprofit educational institutions and not all 
nonprofit educational institutions that might offer remote 
instruction. 66 This is the first of several significant changes 
from the pre-TEACH§ 110(2) requirements. Why the change? 
The Senate Committee Report reiterates the Register's Report 
that '"nonprofit educational institutions' are no longer a closed 
and familiar group, and the ease with which anyone can 
transmit educational material over the Internet" requires 
placing some limitation on the type of entity that can avail 
itself of the TEACH § 110(2) rights. 67 This would preclude a 
small upstart non-profit school (for purposes of the tax laws, a 
501(c)(3) entity for example) from qualifying, as it might not 
63. !d. ai 8. 
64. !d. at 10. 
65. !d. ("Thus, an instructor would not be precluded from using a chart or table 
or other short excerpt from a textbook different from the one assigned for the course, or 
from emphasizing such an excerpt from the assigned textbooks that had been pur-
chased by the students."). 
66. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title Ill, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2) and new 
definition of accreditation. 
67. !d. at 9. This comment is underscored by a general prefatory observation by 
the Committee that "the ability of digital transmission technologies to disseminate rap-
idly and without control virtually infinite numbers of high quality copies, creates new 
risks for owners of copyrighted works used in distance education." Id., at 5. 
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yet be accredited or might never be subject to accreditation. 
The Senate Committee Report indicates that accreditation is 
not defined in terms of programs, but in terms of institutions. 
TEACH § 110(2) defines accreditation in two ways, depending 
on whether the institution is elementary or secondary, or 
whether it is post-secondary. For post-secondary institutions, 
accreditation shall be determined by "a regional or national 
accrediting agency recognized by the Council on Higher 
Education Accreditation or the United States Department of 
Education," and for purposes of K-12 institutions, it "shall be as 
recognized by the applicable state certification or licensing 
procedures. "68 
Third, the new § 110(2) uses the term "mediated 
instructional activities" to indicate that any use of material 
must be "mediated." In other words, the material must be a 
part of the normal teaching that would occur if the classes were 
offered traditionally, and this requires that the material used 
must be part of the class experience. This is the overall theme 
of the reconstructed § 110(2) performance and display right, as 
it was crafted to assuage fears of copyright owners. The concept 
of mediated instructional activities encompasses three concepts 
that might be coined: how ('"integral part' of a class session"), 
who ("controlled by, under the direction of, or under the actual 
supervision of the instructor"), and why ("analogous to the type 
of performance or display that would take place in a live 
classroom setting"). 
The qualifying performance or display of material "must be 
part of the class itself, rather than ancillary to it."69 Further, 
and again with idea of preventing distance education teachers 
from placing excessive amounts of material on a course web 
site because technology easily facilitates this conduct, the use 
of the material must be "controlled by or under the actual 
supervision of the instructor."70 But this "is not intended to 
require either constant, real-time supervision by the instructor 
or pre-approval by the instructor for the performance or 
display ... and the concept of control and supervision is not 
intended to limit the qualification of such asynchronous 
68. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 (new provision explaining the 
meaning of "accreditation"). 
69. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 9 (June 5, 2001). 
70. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301. 
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activities for this exemption."71 Again, the overriding concern is 
that use of materials in the distance education classroom be no 
more extensive than that which would otherwise occur in the 
traditional classroom. 
In order to effect this scheme, 
[t]his latter concept [mediated instructional activities] is 
intended to require the performance or display to be 
analogous to the type of performance or display that 
would take place in a live classroom setting. Thus, 
although it is possible to display an entire textbook or 
extensive course-pack material through an e-book 
reader or similar device or computer application, this 
type of use of such materials as supplemental reading 
would not be analogous to the type of display that would 
take place in the classroom, and therefore would not be 
authorized under the exemption. 72 
In enacting TEACH Congress did not want the expanded 
rights of educators in distance settings to be a carte blanche for 
the inclusion of vast amounts of digital content into online 
instructional settings.73 If an instructor would not use the 
material in a live classroom, he or she should not add it to the 
online currjculum just because distance or other technology 
renders it is easy to do, i.e., to scan, load, and post. The concept 
of mediated instructional activities helps translate the notion 
of the traditional concept of classroom to the digital online age, 
and at the same time, it acts as a major limitation: making 
sure that performance or display of copyrighted material in 
online settings parallels or mirrors that of a live classrooms 
environment. 
The new statutory definition of mediated instructional 
activities included in TEACH "does not refer to activities that 
use, in one or more class sessions of a single course, such works 
as textbooks, course packs, or other material in any media, 
copies, or phonorecords which are typically purchased or 
71. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 9 (June 5, 2001). 
72. !d. at 9-10. 
73. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 (new section 112(f)(2) ("This 
subsection does not authorize the conversion of print or other analog versions of works 
into digital formats, except that such conversion is permitted hereunder, only with re-
spect to the amount of such works authorized to be performed or displayed under sec-
tion 110(2), if ... "). Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 (June 5, 2001) (" It should be emphasized 
that subsection 112(f)(2) does not provide any authorization to convert print or other 
analog versions of works into digital format except as permitted in section 112(f)(2)"). 
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acquired by the students in higher education for their 
independent use and retention or are typically purchased or 
acquired for elementary and secondary students for their 
possession and independent use."74 The Senate Committee 
Report echoes this concept and indicates that the definition 
does not include "electronic course packs, e-reserves, and 
digital library resources," as these sorts of materials are not 
part of the analogous performance and display of materials 
that typically occur in live instructional settings. 75 Again, the 
goal is to have the use of copyrighted material in distance 
environments mirror that which occurs in traditional 
classrooms. So display of textbooks and similar material, even 
if purchased in digital form, could not be used. It is assumed 
that such display would be allowed if the institution or each 
class member paid for each student's access to the digital 
textbook. 
The Senate Report recognized that digital distance 
technologies could displace the need for textbooks, course 
packs, etc., if such material could be loaded onto the distance 
education course web site. However, in K-12 settings, textbooks 
and the like are often not purchased by each student, as is 
typical in higher education; rather, the school district obtains 
the texts then distributes the items for use to each student at 
the beginning of the school year. It is more proper to speak of 
K-12 students as "acquiring" textbooks instead of "purchasing" 
textbooks. The Senate Report was aware of this, and its 
observation of that fact suggests that the revised § 110(2) 
should not be used to require K-12 distance students to begin 
purchasing textbooks if that was not the normal practice.76 
Again, the point is to ask what the normal practice is with 
"live" students, and then mirror that in online settings. As a 
result, a textbook is not per se excluded from the § 110(2) 
TEACH performance and display right. 77 , Portions of a textbook 
could be used, but only if it is either a supplemental textbook or 
74. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 (new provision explaining the 
meaning of"mediated instructional activities"). 
75. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 10 (June 5, 2001). 
76./d. 
77. Id. ("Conversely, because textbooks typically are not primarily produced or 
marketed for performance or display in a manner analogous to performances or display 
in the live classroom setting, they would not per se he excluded form the exemption un-
der the exclusion in the opening clause."). 
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is a small portion of the main textbook, 78 otherwise it would be 
would be excluded as its use would supplant the need for 
purchase or acquisition of it by students. This might occur if 
the textbook were loaded onto the distance education course 
site, and made available for use without purchase or customary 
rental fees paid to the copyright owner. Thus, the plain 
language of the opening proviso of TEACH § 110(2) operates to 
limit the use of an e-textbook or an e-workbook, as these are by 
practical adoption in the distance classroom "transmitted via 
digital networks" and their "primary market is the digital 
network environment, not instructional materials developed 
and marketed for use in the physical classroom."79 
The internal structure of inclusion and exclusion within the 
allowable§ 110(2) performances and displays is strange, as the 
opening "except" clause of § 110(2) and the definition of 
"mediated instructional activities" also identify material 
excluded from its scope. Moreover, the term "mediated 
instructional activities" is also used twice, once in the opening 
"except" clause of § 110(2) and again as part of the specific 
requirements of§ 110(2). Section 110(2)(A) also uses the same 
definition of "mediated instructional activities" that appears to 
contradict or at least confuse the interpretation given to § 
110(2) as a whole (attempting to limit online uses to those that 
occur in a live class). 
The opening clause of a revised § 110(2) applies to 
performances or displays "except with respect to a work 
produced or marketed primarily for performance or display as 
part of mediated instructional activities transmitted via digital 
networks." A later paragraph defining mediated instructional 
activities (MIA) refers to the performance or display of a work 
that is an integral part of the class experience, controlled or 
under the supervision of the instructor, and analogous to the 
type of performance or display that would take place in a live 
classroom setting. However, according to the definition of MIA, 
as discussed earlier, this does not include materials such as 
textbooks, course packs, etc. So what does the opening proviso 
of§ 110(2) also exclude from the expanded rights granted by 
78. !d. ("Thus, an instructor would not be precluded from using a chart or table 
or other short excerpt from a textbook different form the one assigned for the course, or 
from emphasizing such an excerpt form the assigned textbook that had been purchased 
by the students."). 
79. Id. at 8. 
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TEACH that the definition of MIA does not? 
The legislative history suggests that TEACH ensures that § 
110(2) is not used to replace the textbook thus it excludes such 
works from the definition of "mediated instructional activities" 
(MIA). But TEACH also excludes works "produced or 
marketed primarily for performance or display as part of 
mediated instructional activities" from the performance and 
display right§ 110(2) grants to educators. The opening proviso 
exclusion reads: "except with respect to a work produced or 
marketed primarily for performance or display ... " 
One possible answer is that there are three categories of 
works that are in theory acceptable for use in § 110(1) face-to-
face teaching two of which are excluded from the§ 110(2) uses 
by its opening proviso and subsequent operational provisions. 
These three categories include the following items: 1) Non-
MIA works like a textbook or course pack, excluded by the 
subsequent TEACH statutory definition of MIA- educators 
cannot use these works under § 110(2) because it would 
supplant the need for purchase of such items by students; 2) 
MIA works or other curricular materials that meet the 
definition of MIA (integral part of class experience, under the 
control of the instructor, and analogous) and can be used in 
exercise of a § 110(2) activity, (an atlas for examplet0 and 3) 
80. The Senate Report suggests, " ... because textbooks typically are not primarily 
produced or marketed for performance or display in a manner analogous to perform-
ances or display in the live classroom setting, they would not per se be excluded from 
the exemption under the exclusion in the opening clause. Thus, an instructor would 
not be precluded from using a chart or table or other short excerpt from a textbook dif-
ferent from the one assigned for the course, or from emphasizing such an excerpt from 
the assigned textbook that had been purchased by the students." Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 
10 (June 5, 2001). What is unfortunate about this exmnple is the failure to assess the 
result if the instructor desired to use an entire text book other than the one assigned; it 
can only be assumed that this would be excluded under the plain definition of MIA, but 
by the same token the use of a "chart or table or other short excerpt from a textbook 
different from the one assigned" one would expect to be a fair use, e.g., the reproduction 
of such is allowed under the Classroom Guidelines, thus the comment adds or accom-
plishes little beyond what is already known of the copyright law and its application to 
education. It would have been more helpful to indicate what is allowed under the con-
cept of MIA vis-a-vis its definition but excluded by the "primarily" "produced or mar-
keted" MIA phrasing in the opening "except"-ing clause. A more unsettling scenario 
results when educators attempt to use the new TEACH section 112(D ephemeral re-
cording right, discussed below, to digitize analog material for use in a digital distance 
setting. The new digitalization right under section 112(D is tied to uses that are al-
lowed under the reformulated TEACH section 110(2) right. If TEACH section 110(2) 
does not allow its use, then TEACH section 112(D does not allow its ephemeral re-
cording. So even if the use of the material would he a fair use under the copyright law, 
no digitalization rights exists for it under TEACH section 112(f). One could of course 
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MIA works "produced or marketed primarily for ... " the 
distance classroom. 
The last category might be a special multimedia product 
designed for use in conjunction with distance education, as an 
adjunct to a textbook, like the workbook of old, or this might be 
some sort of digital tutorial or self-study aid designed for 
students. The tutorial or self-study aid is not in a "textbook, 
course packs or other material in any media" purchased or 
acquired by students and so it is not excluded by the definition 
of MIA. However, since in this case the item is produced or 
marketed primarily for the distance education environment, 
the work is excluded by the opening proviso of TEACH§ 110(2). 
The fact that a digital product might be adaptable to the 
distance education environment would not trigger the "except" 
proviso of the opening clause, even if it were produced or 
marketed with that adaptability. According to the plain 
language of TEACH, the item must be "produced or marketed 
primarily" for that purpose.81 
Where does that leave distance educators who have items 
"produced or marketed primarily for performance or display as 
part of mediated instructional activities," or, distance 
educational instructional tools? These could not be subject to 
the § 110(2) right by statute. In all likelihood, the use of these 
products would be available to distance educators and their 
students by license or under the terms of sale. If their purpose 
is such that the works are "produced or marketed primarily for 
performance or display as part of mediated instructional 
activities transmitted via digital networks," can it 
automatically be assumed that their use in the distance 
classroom would be intended by their availability in the 
educational marketplace as material "produce[d] and 
market[ed] [ ] primarily for performance or display" for 
distance teaching and as "mediated instructional activities 
transmitted via digital networks" in the first place? 
Perhaps TEACH prevents the use of such items in distance 
education classrooms as a statutorily automatic right, i.e., 
through an expanded educator's right in § 110(2). Rather, it 
argue that fair use not allows not only its performance or display, but also its reproduc-
tion (digitalization), but then again, in those circumstances what does TEACH add to 
the law that is not already known. 
81. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of" 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-2n, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301. 
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forces educators to obtain the right to use materials in the 
marketplace through purchase or license. For example, such 
"distance education-targeted" MIA uses might be allowed 
specifically by their purchase; otherwise, they would not be so 
marketed. This, however, is a big "might." And if a license to 
use the material in digital transmissions does not accompany 
such acquisition, the material could not be used in distance 
education. This is so because, while such items would not run 
afoul of the definition of MIA, the opening exclusion proviso of 
§ 110(2) would exclude their use. While these materials would 
be excluded from the § 110(2) right, such materials might 
conceivably remain available to teachers in live settings under 
the existing § 110(1) where no such "produced or marketed 
primarily for" exclusion proviso exists. 
The purposeful use of a dual conceptualization of MIA 
within the statutory structure is confirmed by Senate 
Committee Repore2 first as the initial ad seriatim 
"requirements" proviso of § 110(2), i.e., §§ 110(2)(A)-(D); and 
second, as discussed in preceding detail, in the opening section 
110(2) excepting clause-each relating to a different function of 
the term MIA. According to the Senate Committee Report; "the 
former [§ 110(2)(A)] relates to the nature of the exempt activity 
[teaching, and in the course of teaching using no more in 
distance environs than in live classrooms]; the latter [opening 
"except" proviso] limits the relevant materials by excluding 
those primarily produced or marketed for the exempt 
t . "t ,83 ac IVI y. 
Fourth, the opening paragraph of TEACH § 110(2) includes 
a provision that the work performed or displayed be a "lawfully 
made" copy. There are two statutory elements in the lawfully 
made copy test or requirement, one objective and the other 
subjective. The objective element asks whether the item used 
is a legitimate copy, as the § 110(2) performance or display 
right does not apply when the "performance or display that is 
given by means of a copy or phonorecord [ ] is not lawfully 
made and acquired under this title." An institution that uses a 
copy in violation of the anti-circumvention rules of 17 U.S.C. 
82. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 7-9 (June 5, 2001) (discussing the opening "except" clause 
regarding mediated instructional activities); Id. at 9-10 (discussing the operation of the 
mediated instructional activities concept as part of the reformulated TEACH section 
110(2)(A)). 
83. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 10 (June 5, 2001) (emphasis added). 
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1201(a), even if that use would be a fair use under§ 107, would 
still be precluded from using it under TEACH § 110(2) as it 
would not be "lawfully made and acquired under this title" 
because it violates § 1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code. 84 
The second subjective element looks to the institutional state of 
mind, a sort of "distance education mens rea." This element 
precludes performances and displays of works where "the 
transmitting government body or accredited nonprofit 
educational institution knew or had reason to believe [it] was 
not lawfully made and acquired." A similar "knew or had 
reason to believe" standard exists in § 110(1)85 and also in 17 
U.S.C. § 504. 86 The latter concerns the remission of statutory 
damages for infringement by nonprofit educational institutions 
when there is a reasonable belief that the use was a fair use 
under§ 107.87 The purpose of the requirement "is to reduce the 
likelihood that an exemption intended to cover only the 
equivalent of traditional concepts of performance and display 
would result in the proliferation or exploitation of unauthorized 
copies."88 
One difference between the current§ 110(1) (and the § 504 
84. One example would be using a work that was circumvented by the school li-
brary or curriculum committee, and allowed under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2002) for pur-
poses of determining whether to purchase the item for the school library, the work once 
accessed cannot be used for any other purpose, such as making it available to students 
until the purchased copy arrives; even if the use would otherwise by allowed under the 
copyright law, under fair use or section 1201, section 1201 forbids it. See Dralter, supra 
n. 3, at§ 2.04, at 2-14-2-2 8.15 
85. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2002) ("is given by a means of a copy that was not lawfully 
made under this title, and that the person responsible for the performance knew or had 
reason to believe was not lawfully made.") (emphasis added). 
86. 17 U.S.C. § 504 ("The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where 
an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of 
the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an em-
ployee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within 
the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, 
which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords ... ") (emphasis 
added). 
87. 17 U.S. C.§ 504(c)(2). 
88. Sen. Rpt.107-31, at 8 (June 5, 2001) (footnote to Register's Report omitted). 
The Register's Report observes that the requirement would prevent educators from in-
terference with the revenue stream owed copyright owners: "The educator would typi-
cally purchase the copy to be used, providing some revenue to the copyright owner. In 
addition, works that had not yet been placed on the market, such as first-run movies, 
would as a practical matter be rendered ineligible, mitigating further any possible im-
pact on sales to the public." The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Dis-
tance Education, Sen. Hrg., 106-539 U.S. Copy. Off. 160 (Corum. on the Jud. May 25, 
1999). 
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standard) and the TEACH § 110(2) standard is whose "mens 
rea" is targeted. Section 110(1) places the inquiry at the 
"person responsible for the performance," i.e., the educator or 
student or guest lecturer, whereas TEACH § 110(2), on the 
other hand, targets the institution. This shift might work to 
increase the compliance responsibilities of the organization, a 
shift which would be otherwise consistent with TEACH and 
would limit the availability of the TEACH§ 110(2) right. Under 
the institutional "mens rea" formulation of TEACH, if anyone 
employed by or acting on behalf of the institution knew or 
suspected the copy was not legitimate the "lawfully made" 
proviso would be triggered and the item cannot be used. 
Considering the copyright compliance issues that some 
educational entities have encountered over the years, it might 
be common to have "reason to believe" that a particular school 
within the district or a certain university educator is using 
copies of material in excess of the copyright law and thus, also 
in excess of the § 110(2) right. 
A second difference in the "lawfully made" requirement of 
both TEACH and § 110(1) is that § 110(1) applies only "in the 
case of a motion picture or audiovisual work, the performance, 
or the display of individual images [from the audiovisual 
work]," whereas TEACH § 110(2) applies to all works covered 
by the expanded TEACH § 110(2) right (i.e., all categories of 
copyrighted works). 89 The broader range of applicable works 
(objective standard) coupled with the institutional emphasis 
(subjective standard) imposes a higher degree of compliance 
from the organization. Under§ 110(1), it could be argued that 
a rogue educator, an educator with an overly simplistic 
approach to the application of fair use, or a widely utilitarian 
or rationalizing mindset, would not trip the "unlawfully made" 
proviso, assuming arguendo that the educator's belief was 
reasonable. Of course, the greater extent to which each 
educator in the school understands the copyright law, the 
smaller the realm of "knew or have reason to believe" instances 
becomes. For example, many educators actually believe that 
all educational uses of material in the classroom are fair under 
the law. Many are so ignorant of the copyright law that they 
reasonably conclude that all unlawful use is legal. Thus, these 
educators arguably meet the requirement of§ 110(1). 
89. ld. ("Unlike the provision in section 110(1), the exclusion here applies to the 
performance or display of any work."). 
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On the other hand, the TEACH § 110(2) "lawfully made" 
proviso would clearly impute such behavior up the institutional 
chain of command. No longer will a "what you don't know 
won't hurt you attitude" offer refuge because someone along the 
way might have a better idea of what is or is not a compliant 
use. This process imposes a higher standard on educators and 
schools. It at least operates to make it more likely that under 
TEACH § 110(2), only those performances and displays that 
incorporate lawfully made copies occur. 
The standard, whether at the educator level(§ 110(1)) or at 
the institutional level (TEACH § 110(2)) remains one of 
reasonableness, not one of ignorance. Yet, unlike 17 U.S.C. § 
504 where the reasonableness issue is directed towards asking 
whether the use is fair, § 110(1) and TEACH direct the 
reasonableness to the somewhat opposite issue of whether 
there was any reason to suspect that the copy used came from 
less than legitimate sources. 90 In other words, TEACH asks 
educators, administrators, and staff whether any red flag exists 
that suggests the copy might be an unlawfully made copy, as 
opposed to whether it is reasonable to assume that the use was 
lawful. This standard appears more generous to educators. 
Educators do not have to prove in their minds that the use is 
legitimate. They are precluded from using the copy only if the 
copy is suspect. However, it would appear reasonable 
(especially in light of the press coverage regarding recent 
copyright developments such as Napster,91 the anti-trafficking 
and anti-circumvention rules,n and the evolving standards of 
90. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2002) ("is given by a means of a copy that was not law-
fully made under this title, and that the person responsible for the performance knew 
or had reason to believe was not lawfully made.") (emphasis added). TEACH 110(2), 
Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301 ("except ... a performance or display that 
is given by means of a copy or phonorecord that is not lawfully made and acquired un-
der this title, and the transmitting government body or accredited nonprofit education 
institution knew or had reason to believe was not lawfully made and acquired.") (em-
phasis added). 
91. See e.f{. Metallica v. Napster Inc., No. 00-0391 (C.D. Cal. filed April 13, 2000). 
92. See 17 U.S. C.§ 1201, and Universal City Studios v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429, 435 
(2d Cir. 2001), the famous DeCSS DVD code-crack case begun when a Norwegian teen-
ager, Jon Johansen, reverse-engineered and posted on the Internet the patch that al-
lowed portability of DVDs; and U.S. u. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 
2002), a similar code-crack case involving Adobe e-book readers, first "cracked' by a 
Russian software programmer Dmitry Sklyarov who was subsequently arrested upon 
entering the United States to deliver a speech on encryption methods at a hacker con-
ference. These and other cases involving section 1201 are discussed in John E. Ottavi-
ani, DMCA Faces Free Speech Challenges, The Nat!. L. J., CL (Oct. 22, 2001) 
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institutional liability)93 that a court or jury deciding the issue 
would conclude that an educator or his or her institution might 
legitimately have reason to believe that, under certain 
circumstances, a copy might be derived from an unlawful 
source. 
Fifth, if TEACH is enacted by Congress, an important 
limitation will still remain in the new formulation of the § 
110(2) right. The limitation will be the uneven treatment of 
various copyrighted works that might be performed or 
displayed in the distance classroom. The TEACH § 110(2) 
performance must be limited to a "nondramatic literary or 
musical work or reasonable and limited portions of any other 
work, or display of a work in an amount comparable to that 
which is typically displayed in the course of a live classroom 
session." Proposed § 110(2) expands the reach of the educator's 
right to include the performance of other works such as a video, 
a category of audiovisual work, but still limits performance of 
that work to a reasonable and limited portion of works. While 
an educator could show an entire video under § 110(1), 
assuming the other requirements of§ 110(1) are satisfied, he or 
she would be limited to a "reasonable and limited portion" of 
the work in an online educational setting. To determine what 
is a reasonable and limited portion one should consider "both 
the nature of the market for that type of work and the 
pedagogical purposes of the performance."94 Does an instructor 
need to show an entire theatrical movie, such as "A Beautiful 
Mind," in a History of Economics class, especially when the 
film is still popular and the DVD version is yet to be released? 
The extent to which a film relates to a course for pedagogical 
reasons arguably lessens the extent to which the film is 
"directly related and of material assistance to the teaching 
content of the transmission. 95 This goes to the pedagogical 
purposes consideration. The showing of the entire film to the 
class would impact the market for rentals or purchase of the 
video or DVD edition by at least some of the students in the 
class. This goes to the nature of the market consideration. 
In summary, under the proposed formulation of TEACH § 
93. See e.g., 17 U.S. C. § 512(e) (discussing the standards for liability reduction for 
copyright infringement by the faculty and staff of institutions of higher education). 
94. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 7-8. (June 5, 2001). 
95. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, TEACH section 110(2)(B). 
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110(2) there are three sorts of uses in the classroom with 
different standards for each. First, performances of 
nondramatic and musical works, like the existing § 110(2) 
right, can be used in distance settings without limit, assuming 
the other requirements of TEACH § 110(2) are met. You can 
read a text or sing a song without limit. Second, displays of 
works are limited "an amount comparable to that which is 
typically displayed in the course of a live classroom session." 
You may scan and load an entire map or chart onto a course 
website if that is what you would do for your live class. Third, 
performances of works other than nondramatic or musical are 
limited to a "reasonable and limited portion" of the work. The 
Senate Committee Report discusses the first two groups of 
works and the portion limitation associated with each, but 
offers no elaboration on the third and limiting group, which 
includes the significant category of audiovisual materials. For 
example, only a "reasonable and limited portion" of a video can 
be loaded onto a course web-site. The text of TEACH § 110(2) 
and the Senate Committee Report save for the nature of the 
market and pedagogical purpose "test" are silent with regards 
to determining what that portion should be. Thus, either the 
courts or interested stakeholders (through the adoption of 
interpretive guidelines similar to those created under § 107), 
will determine what percentage of video in this case would 
constitute an acceptable safe harbor. 
Sixth, the requirements of TEACH §§ 110(2)(A) (the 
direction/supervision, integral part and MIA requirements) and 
110(2)(B) (the "directly related and of material assistance") 
were discussed earlier. The next substantive § 110(2)(C), 
continues a recent Congressional trend and places an increased 
compliance and monitoring burden upon institutions in return 
for continued statutorily secured access to copyrighted material 
in the classroom.96 The compliance and monitoring 
requirements are extensive and complex. 
First, the transmission must be "solely for" "students 
officially enrolled in the course for which the transmission is 
made" while the "reception" of the qualifying transmission need 
only be "to the extent technologically feasible," to "students 
96. Tomas A. Lipinski, An Argument for the Application of Copyright Law to Dis-
tance Education, 13 Am. J. Distance Educ. 7 (1999). See also. The Copyright Office Re-
port on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, Sen. Hrg., 106-53 U.S. Copy. Off. 
150-52 (Comm. on the Jud. May 25, 1999). 
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officially enrolled in the course for which the transmission is 
made."97 Compare this formulation to the existing § 110(2), 
which only requires the transmission be "primarily for" 
students and that the reception be to "classrooms or similar 
places." As discussed earlier, this means that under current 
law as long as the performance or display is intended 
"primarily" for "reception in classrooms or similar places," the 
distance instruction is allowed. However, the transmission 
must be tied to receipt by students in a bona fide physical 
classroom. In fact, the 1976 House Report points out that "the 
instructional transmission need only be made 'primarily' rather 
than 'solely' to the specified recipients."98 
Under the proposed TEACH, however, the transmission 
must now be solely for the specified recipients. TEACH cures a 
major ill of§ 110(2), by specifying where the transmission can 
be received. But, the bill may have created another problem by 
the adoption of the words "solely" and "primarily," which are 
logically more exclusive. Under TEACH, and in contrast to the 
current§ 110(2) "primarily" formulation, any transmission that 
is capable of reception by the public at large would be excluded. 
Though the transmission might still be "primarily" for 
reception of distance students, the transmission would no 
longer be solely for distance students or students officially 
enrolled in the course for which transmission is made.99 
97. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(C)(i). 
98. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Cong.& Admin. 
News 5659, 5697 (1995)). 
99. For example, a web course loaded available through an institution's open web 
site, accessible to anyone would not appear to qualif'y: "In its place [referring to pre-
TEACH section 110(2)(C)(i) "primarily for reception in classrooms or similar places 
normally devoted to instruction" proviso], the Act substitutes the requirement in sub-
paragraph (2)(C) that the transmission be made solely for, and to the extent techno-
logically feasible, the reception is limited to students officially enrolled in the course for 
which the transmission is made ... " The plain language of the statute direct the 
transmission be "solely for" "students officially enrolled" and not everyone else on the 
Internet who might also be interested. The use of closed-web site technology, i.e., 
password protection, is readily available ("technologically feasible") and would also 
need to be employed with respect to its reception. This is underscored by the 1976 legis-
lative history that drew a precise distinction between "primarily'' (1976 version of sec-
tion 110(2)) and "solely" (the reformulated TEACH version of section 110(2)): H.R. Rpt. 
94-1476, at 83 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in U.S. Gong.& Admin. News 5659, 5697 
(1995))("[T]he instructional transmission need only be made 'primarily' rather than 
'solely' to the specified recipients."). This conscious choice of Congress must be ac-
knowledged in its interpretation. One result of this is to make, generic education sites, 
say one created for the purpose of teaching the web browsing public who might stumble 
upon the site about copyright law unavailable for the TEACH section 110(2) right. 
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However, if the transmission is made solely for distance 
students, but results in others being able to access it (its 
reception) because the password was somehow hacked the use 
of the material (performance or display) would not be precluded 
by TEACH § 110(2)(C). Performances and displays of works 
made through educational broadcasts on a local access cable 
network are now foreclosed by TEACH § 110(2)(C)(i). In 
contrast, the place of reception is now expanded to focus on the 
designation of a recipient as a student ("officially enrolled" 
under TEACH § 110(2)(C)(i)), not his or her location ("reception 
in classrooms or similar places normally devoted to instruction" 
under current § 110(2)(C)(i)). The Senate Committee Report 
offers limited breathing room, suggesting that the standard is 
not absolute in its application: 
This requirement is not intended to impose a general 
requirement of network security. Rather, it is intended 
to require only that the students or employees 
authorized to be recipients of the transmission should 
be identified, and the transmission should be 
technologically limited to such identified authorized 
recipients through systems such as password access or 
other similar measures. 100 
As a result, password protection is just one of the institutional 
requirements imposed by TEACH. 101 
Seventh, the institution must now take an active role in 
promoting copyright compliance. Under TEACH§ 110(2)(D)(i), 
the transmitting body or institution must institute copyright 
policies; provide informational materials to faculty, staff, and 
students about copyright law in the hopes of promoting 
compliance; and provide notice to students that course material 
may be subject to copyright protection. 102 Institutions can no 
longer turn a blind eye to the extensive uploading, 
downloading, and printing of course materials by educators and 
While the concept of physical classroom might no longer exist under TEACH, the per-
formance or display must still be used for an actual course of instruction, and not a 
general educational purpose. 
100. Sen. Rpt. 107-31,at 11. 
101. Id. ("This requirement is not intended to impose a general requirement of 
network security. Rather it is intended to require only that the students or employees 
authorized to be recipients of the transmission should be identified, and the transmis-
sion should be technologically limited to such identified authorized recipients through 
systems such as password access or other similar measures."). 
102. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(i). 
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students in the course of a distance class or library e-reserve 
scenario. Uploading, downloading, and printing that 
administrators know occurs and which, at least in some 
instances, is beyond the limits of the copyright law, must be 
met with an institutional response from administrators. These 
practices have become common but, now for the first time, the 
law will require an institutional response such as the adoption 
and arguably the enforcement of policies, promotions, and 
notices. While it could be said that a mere notice requirement, 
similar to the one that currently exists for reproducing 
equipment in libraries under § 108/03 does not necessarily 
require enforcement by the library-institution, TEACH will 
require more. TEACH also commands that "policies regarding 
copyright" be adopted; and if copyright compliance becomes 
part of the formal institutional governance structure vis-a-vis 
policy formulation then the normal governance structure of 
most institutions would also require compliance with and 
enforcement of those polices by and as applied to its 
constituents. Moreover, the TEACH § 110(2)(D)(i) 
requirements are not limited to policies and information 
outreach about copyright issues concerning distance education, 
as there is no such limiting language in the bill. Rather the 
policies, promotions, and notice commands appear to refer to 
copyright issues in general, such as those that might occur in 
general educational settings, not just those specific to distance 
education. However, because TEACH § 110(2)(D)(i) use the 
phrase "the course" when discussing the "notice to students 
that materials used in connection with" proviso, it could be 
argued that the course material notice requirement only apply 
to § 110(2) courses, i.e., distance education courses, whether 
analog or digital. 104The purpose of these requirements is to 
"promote an environment of compliance with the law, inform 
recipients of their responsibilities under copyright law, and 
decrease the likelihood of unintentional and uninformed acts of 
infringement."105 This is a significant advance in the struggle 
to bring schools and other educational entities into copyright 
103. 37 C.F.R. § 201.14 (warnings of copyright for use by certain libraries and ar-
chives). 
104. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(i), 
("provides notice to students that materials used in connection with the course may be 
subject to copyright protection" (emphasis added)). 
105. Sen. Rpt. 107-31,at 11. 
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compliance. Institutions will have to plan, adopt, and 
implement a copyright compliance program that includes 
copyright policies and organizational development programs 
that seek to inform students and staff of copyright law 
requirements and responsibilities. These are issues not 
necessarily associated with distance education alone, but a 
wide array of copyright issues. Institutions will have to have 
warning notices that course materials may be subject to 
copyright law. The notices could be perhaps modeled after 
those already in use for photocopiers.106 Placement could be in 
student handbooks, as a preface to course syllabi, or as part of 
a distance education course web site log-on screen or home 
page. While the TEACH revision to § 110(2) does not require 
the institution to provide training and in-service sessions, it 
does require extensive documentation of policies and 
informational material to be developed for teachers, students, 
and staff. 107 There is no requirement that the institution make 
any assessment of whether faculty, students, and staff have a 
basic level of understanding of the material so developed and 
distributed in order to see whether its compliance efforts are 
effective. However, it would appear that such training and 
assessment components should be part of any effective 
copyright compliance program. One would assume, or perhaps 
hope, that known breaches of any copyright policy so adopted 
would be dealt with by the institution as would similar 
violations of its policies regarding other issues. In addition to § 
110(2)(D)(i), TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii) expands the monitoring 
and compliance activities of educational institutions when the 
transmission is digital-applying to web-based distance 
education transmissions-to require the use of technological 
measures that "reasonably prevent" both the "retention of the 
work in accessible form . . . for longer than the class session" 
and the "unauthorized further dissemination of the work in 
accessible form to others."108 In other words, a school could use 
106. See 17 U.S. C. § 108(0(1) & 37 C.F.R at§ 201.14 (warnings of copyright for 
use by certain libraries and archives). 
107. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(i) ("in-
stitutes polices regarding copyright, provides informational materials to faculty, stu-
dents, and relevant staff members that accurately describe, and promote compliance 
with, the laws of the United States relating to copyright ... "). 
108. The retention provision is new TEACH 110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa), and the dissemi-
nation provision is found in 110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(bb). 
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the display privilege in TEACH § 110(2) to mount related 
background material or record class sessions for later review 
that include the display of copyrighted material. But schools 
could not allow students the capacity to retain the work on 
their own computer or allow students to download the material 
and later upload and transmit it to others in accessible form. 109 
The technological measures need not be one hundred percent 
effective, but must operate to "reasonably prevent" both the 
prohibited retention and further dissemination of the work. 110 
Hopefully, scenarios where a student circumvents or cracks a 
password control system, or the protection technology fails due 
to technical problems with the institution's server, the 
institution still meets the "reasonably prevent[s]" requirement 
of§ 110(2)(D)(ii)(l). However, the institution must then respond 
with tools within its means to rectify the situation. The 
discussion in the House Report (noticeably absent from the 
Senate Report) suggests that periodic review or reevaluation is 
necessary: "Further, it is possible that, as times passes, a 
technological protection measure may cease to reasonably 
prevent retention of the work in accessible form for longer than 
the class session and further dissemination of the work either 
due to the evolution of technology or to the widespread 
availability of a hack that can be readily used by the public."111 
The House Report indicates this is an "objectively reasonable 
standard regarding the ability of a technology protection 
measure to achieve its purpose."112 It does not have to work 
perfectly and prevent each and every retention and 
dissemination, but the technology protection measure must do 
something and by the language of the statute must do it 
"reasonably" well. 113 The House Report offers this observation: 
"Examples of technological protection measures that exist 
today and would reasonably prevent retention and further 
dissemination, include measures used in connection with 
109. See Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa) and (bb) (requiring institution to use "technological measures that 
reasonably prevent" the retention and further dissemination of the work in accessible 
form, respectively). 
110. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(l). 
111. H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). 
112. H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). 
113. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(I). 
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streaming to prevent the copying of streamed material, such as 
the Real Player 'Secret Handshake/Copy Switch' technology 
discussed in Real Networks u. Streambox, 2000 WL 127311 
[Real Networks, Inc. u. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (preliminary injunction)], or digital 
rights management systems that limit access to or use 
encrypted material downloaded onto a computer."114 
In addition, under TEACH 110(2)(D)(ii)(II), the institution 
may not engage in any conduct that "could reasonably be 
expected to interfere" with any technological measure a 
copyright owner places on his/her works to prevent either 
retention or unauthorized further dissemination. 115 This might 
mean that an institution could not obtain material for use in a 
distance class that was limited by a technological block, such as 
one that limits the number of aggregate access and downloads 
of the material per semester, then create and post a patch of 
code or software script that would allow students to exceed that 
number of downloads. As another example, consider a 
situation where the authorized downloading is subject to 
temporal limits by the terms of a license agreement governing 
use of the material, and the system facilitates subsequent 
downloading by students after the course ends by continuing to 
make the legitimate digital key available on the institution's 
web site. 116 This would appear to be "conduct that could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with technological 
measures used by copyright owners to prevent such retention 
or unauthorized further dissemination."117 
The TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(II) "technological measures" 
prohibition is effective regardless of whether the posting would 
be lawful under the anti-circumvention or anti-trafficking rules 
of section 1201. 118 Allowing retention of the work in accessible 
114. H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). 
115. Technolof?y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il) 
("does not engage in conduct that could reasonably be expected to interfere with tech-
nological measures used by copyright owners to prevent such retention or unauthorized 
further dissemination"). 
116. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("On the other hand, an encrypted file would still be 
considered to be in 'accessible form' if the body or institution provides the recipient 
with a key for use beyond the class session"). 
117. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(II). 
118. 17 U.S.C. § 1201. A thorough discussion of the section 1201 anti-
circumvention rules in found in Dralter, supra n. 3. "[L]ike the other provisions under 
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form might be akin to a circumvention of an access device 
under § 1201(a)(1) and allowing further dissemination of the 
work in accessible form might akin to a trafficking of an access 
or use device under §§ 1201(a)(1) and (b), respectively. 
Arguably, the posting of the hacked patch code script in the 
first example in the preceding paragraph would be a § 
1201(a)(2) violation, as it is a dissemination or trafficking of a 
circumventing access technology by allowing the continued 
availability of the legitimate digital key even though the time 
limitation is in violation of the license agreement. 119 Because 
TEACH fails to define what the "conduct that could reasonably 
be expected to interfere with technological measures used by 
copyright owners to prevent such retention or unauthorized 
further dissemination " are, there may be misalignment with 
the § 1201(a) anti-circumvention or anti-trafficking rules. 120 In 
other words, not all TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(I) interferences are 
necessarily violations of the section 1201 anti-circumvention or 
anti-trafficking rules. The section 1201 anti-trafficking rules 
target dissemination of prohibited access and use 
technologies. 121 On the other hand, it would appear that the 
trafficking to students of any such section 1201 circumvention 
technologies would by the plain language of TEACH § 
110(2)(D)(ii)(II) also be "conduct that could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with technological measures used by 
copyright owners to prevent such retention or unauthorized 
further dissemination."122 Thus, it could be concluded that all 
section 1201 violations, if performed by the educational 
institution, would also be TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il) 
violations.123 
TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il) states that the institution may 
"not engage in conduct that could reasonably be expected to 
interfere with technological measures" used by copyright 
paragraph (2)(D)(ii), the requirement [the interference provision of (ii)(ll)] has no legal 
effect other than as a condition of eligibility for the exemption. Thus it is not otherwise 
enforceable to preclude or prohibit conduct." H. Rpt. No. 107-687, 107th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (2002). 
119. See Universal City Studios u. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
120. 17 U.S. C. § 1201, discussion at footnotes 114 and 115. 
121. See Dralter, supra n. 3, at§ 2.04, at§ 2.05, at 2-28.16-2-48.1. 
122. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, H3301, new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(II). 
123. 17 U.S.C. § 1201; Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act 
o{2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 
110(2)(D)(ii)(IJ); discussion supra at ns. 114 and 115. 
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owners to prevent further retention or dissemination as 
discussed above. "[L]ike the other provisions under paragraph 
(2)(D)(ii), the requirement [the interference provision of (ii)(II)] 
has no legal effect other than as a condition of eligibility for the 
exemption. Thus it is not otherwise enforceable to preclude or 
prohibit conduct."124 However, such interference might indeed 
violate the anti-circumvention rule or precede a violation of the 
anti-trafficking rules of 17 U.S.C. § 1201 as well as foreclose 
the application of TEACH. By the same token, it also means 
that institutional "interfere[nce]" with a "technological 
[protection] measure" need not rise to a level meeting the 
requirements ofthe § 1201 rules for that interference to render 
inapplicable the exemption granted by TEACH 110(2). 
In an even more anomalous result, section 1203, the 
penalty provision of the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking 
rules, indicates that under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(5)(A), the "court 
may in its discretion reduce or remit the total award of 
damages in any case in which the violator sustains the burden 
of proving, and the court finds, that the violator was not aware 
and had no had reason to believe that its act constituted a 
violation."12" For qualifying nonprofit entities, the court must 
remit all damages under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(5)(B): 
In the case of a nonprofit library, archives, educational 
institution, or public broadcasting entity, the court shall 
remit damages in any case in which the library, ar-
chives, educational institution, or public broadcasting 
entity sustains the burden of proving, and the courts 
fins, that the library, archive, educational institution, or 
public broadcasting entity was not aware and had no 
reason to believe that it acts constituted a violation."126 
Glaring in its absence is a similar 'know or reason to know' 
proviso in TEACH. In other words, a qualifying entity could 
engage in a violation of the anti-circumvention rule of § 1201, 
"not !be] aware and ha[ve] no reason to believe that it acts 
constituted a violation" and as a result have no monetary 
liability under the § 1201(c)(5) rule but loose its exemption 
under TEACH as it nonetheless interfered with a technological 
measures used by the copyright owner to prevent such 
retention or further dissemination. 
124. H. Rpt. No. 107-687. 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). 
125. 17 U.S. C. ~ 1203(c)(5)(A) 
126. 17 U.S.C. ~ 1203(c)(5)(B). 
142 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2003 
However, it might also not violate the § 1201 rules without 
any need of the damage remission rules but still cause an 
"interference with the technological measures" that triggers the 
loss of the TEACH exemption (unless of course TEACH views 
an 110(2)(D)(ii)(II) interference and § 1201 circumvention as 
the same act, i.e., the legal parameters if each coincide exactly, 
but there is no indication of that intention in either statute or 
the legislative history of TEACH. In fact, the opposite 
conclusion-that a TEACH 110(2)(D)(ii)(Il) act of interference 
is not the same as § 1201 circumvention or trafficking-is 
supported by the TEACH legislative history. For example, the 
legislative history as quoted earlier suggests that an act of 
interference under TEACH is not a separate violation, 
therefore it can be argued that a TEACH interference is not the 
same as a § 1201 circumvention, but merely a qualifying 
precursor to exemption under § 110(2), thus a misalignment 
between TEACH qualification and § 1201 anti-circumvention 
and trafficking occurs. 127 
While the "no longer than the class session" language would 
seem to impose rather harsh temporal limitation on the 
accessibility of distance education course content, the Senate 
Committee Report offers an extensive discussion of the § 
11 0(2)(D )(ii)(l)(aa) retention -beyond -class-session proviso, 
which somewhat tempers this impression. 12R For example, in 
distance education environments, the normal class session is 
not necessarily tied to a specific time period, such as Mondays 
and Wednesdays from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. Yet TEACH uses the 
rather limiting "no longer than the class session" language. 
How does TEACH reconcile this restriction with the twenty-
four-seven construct of contemporary distance education? 129 
The Senate Committee Report redefines the concept of "class 
session." For asynchronous distance education this would be 
the time period during which the student is logged onto the 
server. For the distance student of today and tomorrow, this 
could be two minutes, two hours, or even two days! While the 
acceptable "class session" could be longer than the actual 
synchronous class period, according to the Senate Committee 
Report, "class session" is still shorter than the duration of the 
127. See supra n. 114 for discussion. 
128. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 11-12. 
129. !d. at 4 ("and at times selected by the students"). 
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entire course. · As a result, the Senate Report suggests 
flexibility in allowing material to remain posted on the 
institution server throughout the duration of a course, beyond 
the confines of a synchronous "class session." The Senate 
Report redirects the compliant use of "technological measures 
that reasonably prevent" retention or further dissemination to 
other conduct such as "encrypting the work and limiting access 
to the keys and the period in which such file may be accessed." 
131 This is a progressive concept of availability. However, 
according to the Senate Report, it is "expect[ed] that a common 
sense construction will be applied so that a copy or phonorecord 
displayed or performed in the course of a distance education 
program would not remain in the possession of the recipient in 
a way that could substitute for acquisition or for uses other 
than use in the particular class session."132 Apparently, 
continued access to material for some period less than the 
duration of the course is acceptable because it is not a 
substitute for acquisition. How is "substitute for acquisition" 
viewed in TEACH? Is it a redefined concept as well? 
Apparently so, as the interpretation given to it by the Senate 
Report couples the acceptable retention concept to both 
temporal limits and placement limits.D~ This suggests that 
scenarios where students are permitted to download and store 
personal copies of class materials on their computers in 
accessible form beyond the duration of the course or for some 
other period less than the duration of the course and longer 
than is necessary "to complete the class session," but for which 
the Senate Report offers no other guidance, would be 
prohibited. The technological protection measure must 
l:JO. !d. at 12 ("The duration of a 'class session' in asynchronous distance educa-
tion would generally be that period during which a student is logged on to the server of 
the institution or governmental body making the display or performance, but is likely 
to vary with the needs of the student and with the design of the particular course. It 
does not mean the duration of a particular course (i.e., a semester or term), but rather 
is intended to describe the equivalent of an actual single face-to-face mediated class 
session (although it may be asynchronous and one student may remain online or retain 
access to the performance or display for longer than another student as needed to com-
plete the class session)."). 
l;H.ld. 
132.Jd. 
133. ld. (emphasis added). Temporal limits refer to the expanded notion of the 
"no longer than the class session" language, a redefined notion of class session in order 
"to accomplish the pedago[,rical goals of distance education." Placement limits or "the 
technological protection measure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a 
copy or phonorecord in the computer of the recipient of a transmission." 
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reasonably prevent such retentions. However, both the 
retention and dissemination prohibition clauses of TEACH § 
110(2)(D)(ii)(I) only prohibit retentions and disseminations "in 
accessible form." As explained below, an encrypted version of a 
work kept beyond these temporal and placement limits (e.g., 
beyond the class session and in the computer of the student 
would not be "in accessible form.)" 
Failing to use technological measures that prevents a 
student from transferring the downloaded material "in 
accessible form" to another student, even within the acceptable 
time limits, would also be prohibited under TEACH. This is so 
because the dissemination proviso contains no such temporal 
tie-in.134 However, a student who transfers without 
authorization an encrypted version, one not in accessible form, 
would not. Moreover, a student who prints out a hard copy of 
the work and either keeps it or gives it to another does not 
engage in a prohibited retention, even though by logic it might 
function as a substitute for acquisition. This is so because the 
TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii) prohibition targets only those retentions 
and disseminations in "accessible form."135 While the 
"accessible form" retention proviso could include the download 
and store instance where the digital version is retained (on a 
separate diskette), the legislative history places emphasis only 
upon retentions in accessible form that are stored "in the 
computer of the recipient."136 While it might nonetheless 
appear that the student has retained or acquired a copy of the 
work when he or she prints it out or has disseminated it when 
the print out is given to another person, it is not a violation of 
the TEACH retention or dissemination provision. Is this 
logical? Perhaps not, but it is consistent with the statutory 
134. Compare Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa) ("retention of the work in accessible form by recipients of the trans-
mission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than the class session") 
with new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(bb) ("unauthorized further dissemination of the work 
in accessible form by such recipients to others"). 
135. Compare Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)(aa) ("retention of the work in accessible form by recipients of the trans-
mission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than the class session") 
with new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb) ("unauthorized further dissemination of the work 
in accessible form by such recipients to others"). 
136. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in 
subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the com-
puter of the recipient of a transmission."). 
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language that couples prohibited retentions or disseminations 
only to those that are in "accessible form," 137 and then ties that 
form for retentions to those that "reside in the computer of the 
recipient of a transmission."138 Why is a copy or phonorecord of 
a digital work in accessible treated different, why is digital 
different? Because in the words of the Senate Report, The 
digital transmission of works to students poses greater risks to 
copyright owners than transmissions through analog 
broadcasts. Digital technologies make possible the creation of 
multiple copies, and their rapid and widespread dissemination 
around the world."139 Because a hard copy or printed version is 
not in "accessible form," it does not count as a retention or 
dissemination. 14u Further, the only digital retention that 
counts is one that resides on the computer of the recipient of 
the transmission! The technological protection measure must 
be designed to fulfill these nuances. Thus, the only prohibited 
retention is a digital copy residing on the computer of the 
student-recipient, and the only prohibited dissemination to a 
third party is of a digital copy, either of which cannot be in 
accessible, readable or useable form. In theory, this allows for 
digital retention not on the computer of the recipient. How this 
limited use-after-download or retention on the computer or 
dissemination of digital copy to others is to be technologically 
accomplished is unclear. For example, placing students on an 
honor system to purge their computers of a work downloaded 
and stored after the course ends, expecting class members to 
uphold a promise not to transmit a digital copy of the work 
received during the time needed to complete the class session, 
or having class members promise not to upload a copy retained 
on a diskette or data CD-ROM after the class has ended and 
transfer it to another over the Internet seems unrealistic. 
137. See Technology, Education. and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 
ll0(2)(D)(ii)(l)(aa) ("retention of the work in accessible form by recipients of the trans-
mission from the transmitting body or institution for longer than the class session") 
with new section 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb) ("unauthorized further dissemination of the work 
in accessible form by such recipients to others"). 
138. See Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection meas-
ure in subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the 
computer of the recipient of a transmission."). 
139. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 11. 
140. !d. at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subpara-
graph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer of the 
recipient of a transmission."). 
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Perhaps some sort of digital time bomb, such as an automatic 
degradation of the digital copy, might be encoded into the work 
so after the duration of the course, the work is no longer 
available on the student's computer. The use of a digital key 
that prevents dissemination to another Internet address or 
intranet location would accomplish the same task. Simpler 
encryption technology can also be employed. According to 
TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l), some sort of "technological measures 
that reasonably prevent" these retentions and disseminations 
would have to be adopted. Since printing out the material is 
not contemplated by TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l), for example, the 
technological control measure would not need to prevent that 
action to meet the requirements of TEACH. 
Further, does the "retention of the work in accessible form" 
language refer to any digital format as opposed to non-digital 
formats, or does it refer to a narrower group of digital forms 
residing "in the computer of the recipient of a transmission" 
versus a digital copy located elsewhere?141 If the latter 
happens, then a technological protection measure that allows a 
student to download the work onto his or her computer and 
retain a readable copy there beyond the duration of the course 
would not be in compliance with TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(aa). 
However, if the institution's technological measure allowed 
another student to download the work onto a diskette or data 
CD-ROM, retain the digital and readable copy indefinitely, it 
would still be in compliance, as long as the initial diskette or 
CD-ROM download was made during the duration of the class 
session. 142 It would appear that, while retaining a digital form 
accessible from a diskette would not run afoul of the Senate 
Committee Report language per se, but that unencrypted 
accessible form could never be the source of a subsequent 
dissemination as the TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb) 
141. Id. 
142. The Senate Committee Report suggests that TEACH was not meant to pre-
clude anything beyond retention: "The reference to 'accessible form' recognizes that cer-
tain technological protection measures that could be used to comply with subparagraph 
(d)(D)(ii) do not cause the destruction or prevent the making of a digital file; rather 
they work by encrypting the work and limiting access to the keys and the period in 
which such file may be accessed." Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12. In other words a student 
should not have access to material from the third class in last and fifteenth week but 
could during week three "mak]e] a digital file" and assumingly print out the material 
as well, or retain a digital file but could allow it to reside on his or her hard drive but 
would need it to be on a diskette, however, the student could not do this after the fif~ 
teen weeks of the course have concluded. 
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dissemination proviso only uses the "accessible form" phrasing. 
This suggests a lack of any temporal limitation whatsoever. In 
other words, all digital disseminations in accessible form must 
be reasonably prevented by the technological measure, and 
must be prohibited regardless of location, whether on the 
student's computer, diskette, CD-ROM, or some other 
technological medium. 11:1 How would the institution accomplish 
this, not needing to worry about accessible retentions of the 
work not in the computer of the recipient but needing to 
prevent all further accessible disseminations? Arguably this 
query places great emphasis on a reading of the legislative 
history's interpretation of the retention clause,144 but it might 
suggest the use of both encrypting technology to protect against 
accessible forms beyond the temporal limitation, e.g., a time-
based digital key, and additional technology that prevents a 
computer other than the recipient-student's from receiving and 
accessing the work, a "further dissemination of the work in 
accessible form by such recipients to others." 
The concept of "retention of the work in accessible form" 
then appears more synonymous with the concept of digital 
"access" by students of course content during the term of the 
course.
145 It might have been simpler to place a statutory 
restriction within TEACH against any downloading 
whatsoever, making it the equivalent of a "view only" provision. 
Arguably, this was the intent of the proposal considering the 
"would not remain in the possession of the recipient in a way 
that could substitute for acquisition or for uses other than use 
in the particular class session" Senate Report language.14" But, 
143. /d., at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subpara-
graph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer o{ the 
rccr:pient of a transmtssion."). The Senate Report uses the phrase "refers on to reten-
tion" and not "rders to retention and dissemination", the plain language of TEACH, 
new section 1] 0(2)(D)(ii)(l)(bb), requires the technological measure to reasonably pre-
vent "unauthorized further dissemination of the work in accessible {orrn by such recipi-
ents to others". Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. l07-27:i, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301. 
144. /d. at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in subpara-
graph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer of the 
recipient of a transmission."). 
14fi. !d. ("The reference to 'accessible form' recognizes that certain technological 
protection measures that could be used to comply with subparagraph (d)(D)(ii) do not 
cause the destruction or prevent the making of a digital file; rather they work by en-
crypting the work and limiting access to the keys and the period in which such file may 
be accessed."). 
1 4G. !d. ("ITlhe Committee expects that a common sense construction will be ap-
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as explained above, this approach is contradicted and relaxed 
somewhat by the statutory phrasing of TEACH and other 
supporting legislative history commentary that limits the 
concept of retention only to a narrow category of those works 
that are in "accessible form" (in the computer of the recipient) 
and for a period no "longer than the class session" as that 
concept is defined in the legislative history. 147 
However, from a copyright owner's perspective, the Senate 
Report concept of "retention," expressed as concern for 
materials that "remain in the possession of the recipient in a 
way that could substitute for acquisition," remains problematic 
as there are ways in which this might be accomplished short of 
making the work available in an accessible form beyond the 
duration of the course. Further, it is this sort of retention 
possession by students that continues to bother copyright 
owners. Suppose access to a portion of course content is given 
only to those students who pay the equivalent of a digital 
"materials fee." Consider the student who pays the digital 
materials fee, accesses the digital version from the institution's 
server during the allowable course period, proceeds to print out 
a copy of the work, and thus obtains a copy of the work in a 
non-digital form or gives the resulting printed copy of the 
material to another student taking the course in a following 
semester. In this instance, the student retains a copy in his or 
her possession that would appear to be a prohibited "substitute 
for acquisition" in the legislative history phrasing. 148 In the 
second instance, the student has disseminated the document to 
another, again a prohibited "use[] other than use in the 
particular class session."149 Does this violate TEACH § 
110(2)(D)(ii)(I)? Has an impermissible retention or 
dissemination occurred? 
While printing off a copy of a work would surely seem to 
qualify as a "substitute for acquisition," this is an acceptable 
retention since it is not a retention of the work "in accessible 
form" rather it is a retention in another form. 150 Does this short 
plied so that a copy or phonorecord displayed or performed in the course of a distance 
education program would not remain in the possession of the recipient in a way that 
could sub~titute for acquisition or for uses other than use in the particular class ses-
sion"). 
147. ld. at 11-12. 
148. ld. at 12. 
149. !d. at 12. 
150. ld. at 12 
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change the copyright owner? While it could be argued that this 
result contradicts the spirit of the "remain in the possession of 
the recipient in a way that could substitute for acquisition" 
prohibition of the Senate Report language, this "acceptable" 
retention language might, in reality, apply to a small portion of 
the curricular material. An example of this might be the 
equivalent of what an instructor might display or copy and 
hand out in live class. 151 In other words, under TEACH, 
distance education web sites should not contain entire 
copyrighted works of this sort (textbooks, electronic course 
packs, e-reserves, and digital library resources) because 
TEACH does not authorize the use these works under its 
provisions. The retention and dissemination provisions both 
use the phrase "the work" not any (copyrighted) work, and 
suggest the technological measures need only protect TEACH 
authorized works (performance of a nondramitc literary or 
musical work, reasonable and limited portions of other works 
performed, and the display of works in an amount comparable 
to that which is typically displayed in the course of a live 
classroom session152), not other works that might loaded onto 
the course or library website through license agreement or by 
appeal to some other provision of the copyright law such as fair 
use. Arguably a critical reading of the use of a preposition. 
Though Congress could have used the phrasing "retention of 
the work in any form" or dissemination of any work in 
accessible form: but it did not. Thus the restricted reading is 
arguable. As a result, when all is said and done, the amount of 
material that the reformulated TEACH § 110(2) performance 
and display right applies to is rather a small amount of 
material that might conceivably be loaded onto a distance 
education course web site. 153 Thus, allowing students to retain 
151. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o{ 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2) ("or dis-
play of a work in an amount comparable to that which is typically displayed in the 
course of a live classroom session"). "The 'limited portion' formulation used in conjunc-
tion with the performance right is not used to [sic] connection with the display right 
exemption, because for certain works, display of the entire work could be appropriate 
and consistent with displays typically made in a live classroom setting (e.g., short po-
ems or essays, or images of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, etc)'' Sen. Rpt. 107-
31, at 8. 
152. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 110(2). 
153. Id. (Displays are limited to the "amount comparable to that which is typi-
cally displayed in the course of a live classroom session.") Yet, it is likely thnt many 
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a copy of this material in a non-accessible form is acceptable. 
It is also supported by Senate Report language that places 
concern on "retention of a copy or phonorecord in the computer 
of the recipient of a transmission"154 beyond the duration of the 
course,
155 
and not on other retentions such as printing out a 
hard copy. However, instead of coupling the concept of 
retention to form and time, it would have been simpler to 
merely state what sort of retentions, if any, is acceptable. The 
same rationale would apply to the issue of whether a 
technological measure that fails to prohibit such dissemination 
meets the standard established by TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii) and 
is thus prohibited as dissemination is linked only to those in 
accessible form. In other words, the technological measure 
must only reasonably prevent disseminations in digital form. 
EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS: INTERMEDIATE REPRODUCTION AS A 
PRECURSOR TO ONLINE INSTRUCTION 
A final substantive section of TEACH amends the 
"Ephemeral Recordings" provisions of § 112 by adding a new 
subsection (f) to cover digital transmissions. 156 This adjustment 
is necessary because the task of readying the copyright law to 
facilitate distance education in the electronic age would be 
incomplete if TEACH addressed the revision of§ 110(2) alone 
and left the issue of intermediate copying untouched. In the 
days of "distance education as broadcast," when an instructor 
course web sites contain a fair amount of additional reading material or at least are 
linked to that material from the course web site, linked to the institution's library e-
reserve, and as discussed earlier "electronic course packs, e-reserves, and digital li-
brary resources," are not part of the TEACH section 110(2) performance and display 
right. !d. at 10. 
154. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 ("Conversely, the technological protection measure in 
subparagraph (2)(D)(ii) refers only to retention of a copy or phonorecord in the com-
puter of the recipient of a transmission."). 
155. !d. ("The reference to 'accessible form' recognizes that certain technological 
protection measures that could be used to comply with subparagraph (d)(D)(ii) do not 
cause the destruction or prevent the making of a digital file; rather they work by en-
crypting the work and limiting access to the keys and the period in which such file may 
be accessed."(emphasis added)). This language would appear to allow for downloading 
with retention limited to the duration of the course or for the printing out of the mate-
rial (a non-digital copy). On the other hand it might merely mean that not all compli-
ant technological measures need "cause the destruction or prevent the making of a 
digital file." 
156. Technolo{;y, Education, and Copyri&ht Harmonization Act of' 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(f). 
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would bring a work into the classroom and perform or display 
it, the transmission of that teaching, whether by broadcast or 
transmission over traditional airways, did not require that an 
intermediate copy of the work be made. Rather, a 
"transmission copy" was made when the display was captured 
by use of the recording-broadcast technology. However, in the 
new age of distance education with its array of teaching tools, 
an instructor will be more likely to record and synchronize his 
or her voice over a series of digitized images such as maps, 
charts, or an article. Perhaps these can be incorporated into a 
Power Point or web-based presentation, or at least made into 
digital versions that can be available to students as separate 
resources. 
TEACH makes it clear that copies made previous to a valid 
reformulated § 110(2) performance or display would not be an 
infringement of the owner's exclusive right. 157 It is not an 
infringement "to transmit a work that is in digital form and, 
solely to the extent permitted in paragraph (2) [referring to 
subparagraph (2) of 112(f), as amended, i.e., what would be a 
new 112(f)(2)], of a work that is in analog form, embodying the 
performance or display to be used from making transmissions 
authorized under § 110(2)."158 In other words, the new § 
112(f)(1) governs the copying-transmission of digital works, and 
the new section 112([)(2) governs the copying-transmission of 
all other works such as those in analog form, which must first 
be converted to digital form before a transmission can occur. 159 
According to the Senate Report, "[u]nder new subsection 
112([)(1), transmitting organizations authorized to transmit 
performances or displays under section 110(2) may load on 
their servers copies or phonorecords of the performance or 
display authorized to be transmitted under section 110(2) to be 
used for making such transmissions."160 However, several 
caveats exist. First, under revised paragraph 112(f)(l)(A) 
governing digital works, the § 112(f) right applies only if "such 
copies or phonorecords are retained and used solely by the body 
or institution that made them, and no further copies or 




160. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 & 14. 
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under section 110(2)."161 Does this mean the institution must 
ensure that students do not make downstream copies? Not 
necessarily, as long as the institution otherwise complies with 
the § 110(2) requirement to impose technological controls 
where feasible to "reasonably prevent" retention or 
unauthorized further dissemination, the previous discussion of 
exactly what is meant by "retention" notwithstanding. 162 
However, what this language does suggest is that the 
governmental body or institution could not share a copy made 
with another entity, such as by transferring a file of 
supplemental materials it took the time to collect and load as 
part of a distance course to another school district for use in a 
related course in its distance program. The "used solely by" 
language would prohibit this transfer. 163 Nor could the school 
make a copy of the materials after the course ends and allow a 
fellow faculty member to use it in designing his or her own 
distance education class, as this would violate the "no further 
copies or phonorecords are reproduced from them" proviso. 164 
The institution could allow the copies to remain on its server 
("retained and used solely by the body or institution that made 
them"165 ) for use in a subsequent semester. 166 The "further 
copies or phonorecords" that are allowed, are limited to those 
"authorized by section 110(2)." This would included the 
authorized retention in accessible by a student in accordance 
with TEACH § 110(2)(D)(ii)(I) discussed earlier. 
In addition, under TEACH § 112(D(1)(B), the copies or 
phonorecords must be "used solely for transmissions authorized 
under § 110(2)."167 For example, the body or institution could 
not make a second digital copy for use in its own library as part 
161. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, § 13301, new section 112(f)(1 )(A). 
162. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, ~13301, new section 
110(2)(D)(ii)(l)(aa). 
163. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(D(1)(A). 
164. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of'2002. I d. 
165. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002. !d. 
166. "Under new subsection 112(f)(1), transmitting organizations authorized to 
transmit performances or displays under section 110(2) may load on their servers cop-
Ies or phonorecords of the performance or display authorized to be transmitted under 
section 110(2) to be used for making such transmissions." Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 12 & 14. 
167. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, ~13301, new section 112(D(l)(A). 
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of an e-reserve for on-site or campus-based students, even if 
such use or distribution might be authorized under §§ 107 (fair 
use) or 108(c) (governing additional reproduction and 
distribution rights for qualifying nonprofit libraries and 
archives) or by a license agreement. While this additional use 
on campus would not necessarily violate TEACH § 112(f)(l)(A) 
which is the "used solely by" the institution that made them 
provision, it does violate the TEACH § 112(f)(l)(B) "solely" for§ 
110(2) purposes proviso. 168 
Under TEACH, an amended § 112 does not provide 
institutions with a carte blanche ability to create digital 
libraries for use in remote educational settings: "It should be 
emphasized that subsection 112(f)(2) does not provide any 
authorization to convert print or other analog versions of works 
into digital format except as permitted in section 112(f)(2)."169 
However, if under revised 110(2) an instructor would show a 
map in class, for example, he/she would need to have a loaded 
"digital" copy of that map available on the course web site for 
distance students who might access the class content twenty-
four-seven. TEACH § 112 allows the copy of this material onto 
the institution's server and to remain there for access by 
students. 170 
Under a more narrow reading, it could be argued that all 
that is allowed is the "ephemeral recording" of the instructor 
holding up the map while recording his lecture for the course 
web-site. However, this is in fact the major limitation of the 
current ephemeral recording provision, § 112(b).171 "However, it 
[existing section 112(b)] would not authorize the making of 
transient reproduction necessary to the technical process of 
transmission in online courses ... "172 Title 17 United States 
16fl. Technolo{{y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title lii, Subtitle C, §13301, new section 112(D(1)(A) and 
(B). 
169. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14. 
170. Id. ("In order for asynchronous distance education to proceed, organizations 
providing distance education transmissions must be able to load material that will be 
displayed or performed on their servers, for transmission at the request of students."). 
But TEACH 1 12(f)(l) and (2) both make clear that the ephemeral recording always un-
derlies a TEACH 110(2) use of the work. See Technology, Education, and Copyright 
Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, 
~ 1:1301, new section 112(f)(l) and (2). 
171. 17 U.S. C. § 112(b). 
172. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education; 
Sen Hrg. 106-539, 106'" Cong., at 95. 
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Code, section 112, enacted as part of the 1976 Act, allowed an 
ephemeral recording to be made during "live" broadcasts and 
transmitted to classes. 173 The remote nature of the educational 
experience required that a copy of the initial broadcast be sent 
to students who did not receive it because of an illness, a 
scheduling conflict, or a technical malfunction.174 Subject to 
certain limits, this section allowed the transmitting entity to 
keep a copy of the transmission for archival purposes, and 
other copies (up to thirty copies total) were destroyed within 
175 
seven years. 
The U.S. Copyright Office Report and TEACH make a fine 
distinction between performances and displays and the copying 
that must necessarily occur as part of a distance education 
scenario, either before or along with that performance or 
display. While there might not be much difference to educators 
between the scan or post and its performance or display, this 
transparency is still not contemplated by the new law. 
According to the U.S. Copyright Office Report, even its 
recommended "amended version of § 110(2) in itself would not 
permit the reproduction necessary for an educator to post the 
work to be performed or displayed to the course site, for later 
access by students."176 Thus, an amendment of 17 U.S.C. § 112 
is also needed. 177 "Accordingly, we [the U.S. Copyright Office] 
recommend adding a new subsection to section 112 that would 
permit an educator to upload a copyrighted work onto a server, 
to be subsequently transmitted under the conditions set out in 
§ 110(2) to students enrolled in her course."178 As a result, if the 
"posting" is made as a precursor to a bona fide TEACH§ 110(2) 
performance or display, then its maintenance on the school 
server until a distance student accesses the material 
(triggering a new transmission of the posting) is an allowable 
ephemeral recording under TEACH § 112(f).179 
173.17U.S.C. § 112(b)(2). 
17 4. This is one use of the 1976 ephemeral recording right in 112(b). 
175. 17 U.S. C. § 112(b)(2). 
176. The Copyright Office Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education: 
Sen. Hrg. 106-539, 106th Cong., at 160. 
177. Attention to this need was made by those testifying at the field hearings 
held by the Register of Copyrights throughout the early months of 1999, see, e.g., Tes-
timony of Tomas A. Lipinski (Additional Discussion), in id. at 138-39. 
178. !d. at 161. 
179. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 ("Under new subsection 112(0(1), transmitting or-
ganizations authorized to transmit performances or displays under section 110(2) may 
load on their servers copies or phonorecords of the performance or display authorized to 
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Secondly, TEACH § 112(D(l)(B) requires that "such copies 
or phonorecords [bej used solely for transmissions authorized 
under section 110(2)."180 This repeats the concluding clause of 
TEACH § 112(f)(l): "embodying the performance or display to 
be used from making transmissions authorized under § 
110(2)."181 Is this superfluous? If not, under TEACH § 
112(f)(l), the "embodying the performance or display to be used 
from making transmissions authorized under § 110(2)" 
language requires that the initial motivation for making 
ephemeral recording ("to make copies or phonorecords") be 
dependant upon a bona fide § 110(2) activity. 182 Similar 
TEACH § 112(f)(l)(B) language, which says, "such copies or 
phonorecords are used solely for transmissions authorized 
under § 110(2)," suggests that the subsequent transmission of 
the copy be for § 110(2) purposes. 183 In other words, there is a 
dual TEACH § 110(2) "purpose" requirement in the new 
TEACH ephemeral recording right: one related to the reason 
for making initial "copies or phonorecords" (TEACH § 
112(f)(l)), and the second related to the actual use of those 
"copies or phonorecords" (TEACH § 112(f)(l)(B)) in the 
subsequent transmission. 184 Once the initial copies of 
phonorecords are made for a TEACH § 110(2) purpose, the 
copies of phonorecords can only be used for Title 17 U.S.C. § 
( ) 
ISS 110 2 purposes. · 
Third, TEACH § 112(f) "requires the use of works that are 
be transmitted under section 110(2) to be used for the making such transmissions."). 
180. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(D(l)(B). 
181. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(0(1). 
182. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(0(1). 
183. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-2n, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S. C. § 
112(f)(1)(A). 
184. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S C. § 
112(11(1) and (f)(l)(A). 
185. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(fl(l)(B). 
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already in digital form,"186 so that the availability of digital 
copies of works does not proliferate and cause them to be used 
in infringing ways. However, some works may not be available 
in digital form, and so TEACH § (f)(2) was created to govern 
the limited use (copying) of works when no digital format is 
available. 187 However, this digitization right is limited and is 
not to be equated with a general safe harbor right to digitize 
material for use in educational pursuits. 188A non-digital work 
can be digitized for use in distance education scenarios under 
TEACH § 112(f)(2) when either "no digital version of the work 
is available to the institution" (a limitation imposed by TEACH 
§ 112(f)(2)(A)), or the "digital version of the work that is 
available to the institution is subject to technological protection 
measures that prevent its use for section 110(2)" (the limitation 
of TEACH § 112(f)(2)(B)).189 Even under either of these 
circumstances, wholesale digitization is not permitted. 190 
Rather, digitization is permissible "only with respect to the 
amount of such works authorized to be performed or displayed 
under § 110(2)." This restriction is found in the introductory 
paragraph of TEACH § 112(f)(2). 191 
Under either of the above circumstances, digitization of the 
work can only be for the portion of the work that is authorized 
by TEACH § 110(2).192 The opening paragraph of TEACH § 
110(2) contains three "limitation" directives: first, there IS no 
186. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14. 
187. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of"2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, § 13301, creating new 17 U.S C. § 
112(!)(2). 
188. TEACH section 112(D(2) contains the following opening proviso: "ltlhis sub-
section does not authorize the conversion of print or other analog versions of works into 
digital formats, except ... " See also, Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 ("It should be emphasized 
that subsection 112(f)(2) does not provide any authorization to convert print or other 
analog versions of works into digital format except as permitted in section 112([)(2)."). 
189. Techn.olo!{y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o/2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-27:3, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(D(2) 
190. TEACH section 112([)(2) contains the following opening proviso: "[t]his sub-
section does not authorize the conversion of print or other analog versions of works into 
digital formats, except ... " See also, Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 ("It should be emphasized 
that subsf~ction 112([)(2) does not provide any authorization to convert print or other 
analog versions of works into digital format except as permitted in section 112(D(2)."). 
191. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of"2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S. C. § 
112(D(2). 
192. /d. ("only with respect to the amount of such works authorized to be per-
formed or displayed under section 110(2)"). 
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digitization limitation on the portion of a nondramatic literary 
or musical work that is performed; secondly, for works other 
than nondramatic or musical works that are performed, the 
portion of the work that can be digitized is limited to a 
"reasonable and limited portion" of the work; and thirdly, for 
works that are displayed, the portion of the work that can be 
digitized is limited to the amount that would be used in a live 
face-to-face teaching encounter.m This allowable digitization 
portion might then translate in practice to be a cassette 
recording of a Bernstein song (no limitation), a clip from a 16 
mm movie (reasonable and limited portion), or a textbook page 
containing a chart, table, or graph (an amount comparable to 
that which is typically displayed in the course of live classroom 
session). 
Because of TEACH § 110(2), TEACH § 112(f)(2) may give 
educators the ability to "ignore" the "performance" right to a 
musical work, i.e., the underlying score of the Bernstein piece, 
but not the performance right to copy it for later performance 
via distance education web technology. 194 In general, there is 
no performance right in sound recordings. 195 In the days of 
analog recordings and traditional broadcasts, this absence of a 
performance right in sound recordings posed no problem to 
distance educators, so the category of copyrighted works under 
17 U.S.C. § 110(2) did not need to be enlarged. 196 However, 
since then, Congress expanded copyright owners' "exclusive" 
rights to include a performance right in a sound recording 
when performed by means of a "digital audio transmission."197 
Once a work is digitized and transmitted over the Internet 
through distance education delivery technology, a digital audio 
transmission has occurred, which triggers the § 106(6) 
performance right for digital audio transmissions of sound 
recordings. 19R According to the previous discussion, if this 
"performance right" applies to works digitized under TEACH 
112(f)(2), then TEACH § 110(2) grants a right to ignore a 
19:~. Tcchnolo!{y, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-27:1, llG Stat. 1758, Title HI, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2). 
194. See Hazard, supra n. 9, at 4-54 ("Separate and distinct from the musical 
copyright in the song, there is a copyright in the recorded performance of that song"). 
195. 17 U.S.C. ~ 106(G). 
196. l'rc-TEACJI 17 U.S.C. ~ 110(2). 
197. See 17U.S.C. ~ 106(6). 
HJR. ld. 
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copyright owner's performance right in the musical work, but 
not to ignore the performance right in the sound recording of 
the musical work, or at least as far as TEACH § 110(2) is 
concerned only the "reasonable and limited portions of any 
other work" that is performed. 199 As a result, a separate 
performance right still needs to be obtained from the copyright 
owner of the sound recording to convert the entire cassette 
recording of the Bernstein song to a digital format and then 
transmit is over the Internet in a distance education class. 200 In 
summary, digitalization can occur under TEACH § 112(f)(2) 
199. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act o{2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2). 
200. TEACH section 112(D(2) would not allow for the digitization of the Bern-
stein song in its entirety. While there is no problem with respect to the performance 
right associated with the use of musical work, i.e., the underlying song, as TEACH sec-
tion 110(2) contains no such portion limitation on this category of work performed-
assuming of course that the other requirements of TEACH section 112CD(2) are met (no 
digital version available or if available it is subject to technological protection meas-
ures. There is, however, is a problem with respect to the sound recording, i.e., the "per-
formance" of the musical work captured in a sound recording (in and of itself a deriva-
tive work and thus a "work" subject to copyright protection) by Arthur Fiedler and the 
Boston Pops, the New York Philharmonic, etc., and the right to perform it by means of 
digital audio transmission. The performance right belongs to whoever owns the copy-
right in the performance (sound recording) of the work-the recording artist, the record 
company, or some other entity. Under TEACH section 112CD(2), commands to limit the 
ephemeral recording (digitization) arc those which would be authorized under TEACH 
section 110(2). The amount able to be digitized would thus be limited to a "reasonable 
and limited portion" of the work, as the only two categories that can be performed in 
their entirety under TEACH section 110(2) are nondramatic literary and musical 
works. The right to transmit under TEACH section 112(0(2) is limited to "the amount 
of such works authorized to be performed or displayed under section 110(2)." Under 
TEACH section 110(2) for sound recordings-works other than "nondramatic literary 
or musical works"-this amount is limited to a "reasonable and limited portion" of the 
work. 
While there is no discussion of this point in the legislative history, the plain lan-
guage of TEACH section 112(D(2) does not suggest any other result than the following. 
Because the analog cassette recording consists of two categories of copyrighted works--
musical and sound recording-which are each limited by a different TEACH section 
110(2) amount-the more restrictive limitation must apply. Digitization is limited to 
the "conversion of the portion or amount of such works that are authorized to be per-
formed or displayed under section 110(2)" (Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14), and since one can-
not separate the two rights associated with the embodiment of the work in the cassette 
recording-a "musical" work and a "sound recording"-the amount that could be digi-
tized in the first instance under TEACH section 112(f)(2) is limited to a "reasonable 
and limited portion" of the work. If this is not the result that Congress intended, then 
TEACH section 110(2) should be amended to include the performance right of a sound 
recording by means of digital audio transmission in otherwise qualifying educational 
scenarios (Under Title 17, United States Code, section 110(2)). This could be accom-
plished by expanding the "nondramatic literary and musical work" clause of TEACH 
section 110(2) to include sound recordings by digital audio transmissions. 
95] LEGAL REFORM IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 159 
assuming the requirements of TEACH § 112(f)(2) are met, or a 
digital copy of a digital version of the work can made. In either 
case, that portion that may be used in limited to the amount 
authorized by TEACH§ 110(2). With the Bernstein recording, 
there are two copyrights in it so to speak, the musical work (the 
underlying music) and the sound recording of it. TEACH § 
110(2) states that the performance of musical works, digital or 
otherwise is unlimited, i.e., there is no limiting language in 
TEACH § 110(2). As to the performance of the sound recording 
(the playing of the recording), when the distance education 
transmission is analog, no further right of the copyright owner 
is implicated, as there is no performance in a sound recording. 
However, when the playing of the recording is via a digital 
transmission a performance right does indeed exist and 
TEACH § 110(2) must be consulted. That section states that 
the performance of works other than "nondramatic literary or 
musical works" is limited to "reasonable and limited portions 
of' the work and so a performance right would be needed for 
that portion of the work beyond the "reasonable and limited 
portions of' the work that TEACH§ 110(2) does grant the right 
to use. 
Finally, the use of the phrase "available to" in both TEACH 
§§ 112(f)(2)(A) and (B) is not the same as saying "purchased," 
"licensed," or "in the possession of' the institution. Arguably, 
the existence of a digital version of the work "available to" the 
institution could occur in any number of ways beyond actual 
ownership or possession. Thus, if the work is somehow 
available by purchase or through interlibrary loan, an 
institution cannot digitize an analog copy. 201 Instead, it has to 
obtain an "available" digital copy through purchase or license 
or loan, and it has to use TEACH § 112(f)(l) to authorize its 
ephemeral copying (such as uploading onto the distance 
education course web site). 202 It must also employ TEACH § 
110(2) to authorize its transmission to distance education 
scenarios. 203 Furthermore, if Congress desired to anchor the 
"available to" clause to mean ownership or possession alone or 
201. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act oj'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. ~ 
112(0(2). 
202. !d. 
20:~. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act oj'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2). 
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otherwise physically in the hands of the institution and not a 
general marketplace or access availability it could have easily 
done so as it did in section 108 regarding the copying, including 
digitalization, that qualifying libraries and archives can make 
of unpublished and published works.204 This process 
underscores the need for sale or license agreements governing 
digital material that an educational institution might 
specifically use in distance environments to allow for these 
ephemeral recording rights. A license agreement forbidding 
such use would override any rights granted by TEACH.205 If 
"available" means something more than actual possession, but 
is more equated with access to the work vis-a-vis the 
marketplace for example, then this would suggest that in 
situations where the institution desires to digitize a work for 
use in an otherwise qualifying distance education transmission, 
several steps must be taken. First, a check must be made to 
determine if a digital version is available, if so it must 
purchase it instead of converting its analog copy. However, if 
the institution determines that the digital copy of the work 
that is available for purchase it comes with technological 
protection measures, the institution does not have to purchase 
a copy first in order for the digital version of the work to be 
available to it. This is so because "available to" as discussed 
above does not mean purchase or otherwise in the collection.206 
204. Section 108(b) states that "[t]he rights of reproduction and distribution un-
der this section apply to three copies or phonorecords of an unpublished work dupli-
cated solely for purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for research use in 
another library or archives of the type described by Clause (2) of subsection (a), if-(1) 
the copy or phonorecord reproduced is currently in the collections of the library or ar-
chives; and (2) any such copy or phonorecord that is reproduced in digital format is not 
otherwise distributed in that format and is not made available to the public in that 
format outside the premises of the library or archives." 17 U.S.C. 108(b) (emphasis 
added). Section 108(c) contains a similar "the copy or phonorecord reproduced is cur-
rently in the collections of the library or archives" provision. 
205. See ProCD u. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
206. Of course the contrary argument is that if Congress had desired a "market-
place tes" to be made, it could have made that an express command in TEACH section 
112(D(2), as it did in section 108 regarding the copying, including digitalization, that 
qualifying libraries and archives can make of unpublished and published works. Sec-
tion lOS(c) states that "[tjhe right of reproduction under this section applies to three 
copies or phonorecords of a published work duplicated solely for the purpose of re-
placement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if 
the existing format in which the work is stored has become obsolete, if-(1) the library 
or archives has, after a reasonable effort, determined that an unused replacement can-
not be obtained at a fair price; and (2) any such copy or phonorecord that is reproduced 
in digital format is not made available to the public in that format outside the premises 
of the library or archives in lawful possession of such copy." 17 U.S.C. 108(c) (emphasis 
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In other words, the technological protection requirement of § 
112(f)(2)(B) is triggered, i.e., without having to purchase a copy 
of it first. 207 
Three scenarios appear under TEACH § 112(f). First, the 
work may be only available in analog form, in which case 
digitization is allowed because it meets the explicit 
requirement of TEACH§ 112(f)(2)(A) (conversion allowed when 
no digital version is available).208 Secondly, the work may or 
may not be available in analog form, but it is definitely 
available in digital form, in which case digitization is also 
prohibited by TEACH § 112(f)(2)(A).209 Thirdly, the digital 
version of the work may be "subject to technological protection 
measures that prevent its use for § 110(2)," in which case 
digitization is allowed by TEACH § 112(f)(2)(B).210 The 
technological protection measure need not be designed 
specifically to prevent distance education transmission, it just 
must prevent use for a TEACH § 110(2) purpose. 211 This poses 
an odd series of choices for the copyright owner. 
A copyright owner who chooses not to release a version of 
his/her work in digital form faces possible digitization of the 
analog version by a qualifying educational institution under 
TEACH§§ 112(f) and 110(2), which are the ephemeral copying 
and distance transmission provisions.212 Justifiably, the grant 
of the conversion ability (analog to digital) to support distance 
teaching is consistent with the underlying purpose of 
added). 
207. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of'2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(0(2)(B). 
208. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-27:3, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(0(2)(A), assuming the use is for an authorized TEACH section 110(2) performance 
or display. 
209. !d. 
210. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14. ("In those circumstances where no digital version is 
available to the institution or the digital version that is available is subject to techno-
logical measures that prevent its use for distance education under the exemption, sec-
tion 112(f)(2) authorizes the conversion from an analog version ... "). 
211. !d. ("However, the Committee recognizes that some works may not be avail-
able for use in distance education, either because no digital version of the work is 
available to the institution, or because available digital versions are subject to techno-
logical protection measures that prevent their use for the performances and displays 
authorized by section 110(2)"). 
212. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(f)(2)(A). 
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TEACH.m However, a copyright owner who does decide to 
offer a digital version of her work in the marketplace in 
addition to an analog one is at least protected from further 
digitization of the existing analog copies by TEACH § 
112(f)(2)(A).214 As a practical result, the law forces educational 
institutions to either purchase, license, or otherwise obtain and 
use a digital version of these works. 215 This assumes of course 
that "available to the institution" is interpreted to mean a 
general availability, in the marketplace, for example. This at 
least offers some possibility that the copyright owner will 
benefit from additional royalties from sale or license fee of the 
copyrighted work. 216 On the other hand, a copyright owner who 
places a technological protection measure on the digital version 
of her work because she fears exploitation in the distance 
education environment is specifically thwarted by TEACH § 
112(f)(2)(B) because digitization of an analog copy is then 
specifically authorized.217 Thus, the best a copyright owner who 
does not want her works used in distance education scenarios 
can do is either make sure no analog copies exist (most likely 
an impossibility), or offer a digital version in the marketplace 
but not one that is encrypted or contains some other 
technological protection to preclude conversion to digital form 
and hope to generate revenues when educational institutions 
buy it initially.218 A copyright owner who, out of fear of 
exploitation or abuse, places digital protective measures on his 
work actually promotes further digitization of existing analog 
copies.~19 Thus, the concept behind technological preventative 
213. Sen. Rpt. 107-31, at 14 (touting the ability of learners to access digital 
transmission asynchronously). 
214. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(D(2)(A). 
215. ld. 
216. Since availability forecloses digitalization under TEACH 112(D(2), a copy of 
the work will likely first need to be purchased or licensed before its ephemeral copying 
(loading onto the institution's distance education server) can occur under TEACH sec-
tion 112(D(1). 
217. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 17 U.S.C. § 
112(f)(2)(B). 
218. If it exists in digital form but a technological protection exists on it, then 
digitalization of extant analog copies is allowed under id. 
219. This is so because Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act 
of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 
17 U.S. C. § 112(f)(2)(B) authorized digitization of analog copies when the "digital ver-
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use measures appears to be defeated. 
However, if a copyright owner fails to use a technological 
protection measure, his work will become easily available for 
illegal copyright exploitation in other non-17 U.S.C. § 110(2) 
environments. 22° For some copyright owners, this choice is 
difficult. If the owner uses a technological protection measure 
to protect against excessive (in a practical sense) or unfair (in a 
legal sense) uses, he will not have recourse in TEACH 
scenarios (through the TEACH § 112(f)(2)(B) conversion 
right). 221 If the owner chooses not to use a technological 
protection measure to make a digital version available in the 
market, he will be making an exploitable version available (the 
work is unprotected by technological measures against illegal 
uses). 222 Doing this might be especially undesirable for 
copyright owners whose primary market is education. If their 
works are left unprotected by technological protection 
measures, they may face widespread abuse in other 
scenarios. 22:1 This may also work to force copyright owners to 
employ mechanisms such as license by which the terms and 
conditions of use can restrict the TEACH grant of use or secure 
through the license negotiation an adequate revenue stream for 
the performance or display and ephemeral recording that does 
occur. 
TEACH224 is a complex and convoluted amendment to the 
sian that is available to the institution is subject to technological protection measures." 
220. See e.g Universal City Studios, Inc. u. Corley, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25330 
(2d Cir. 2001) (circumvention of DVD technological protection measure); U.S. u. Elcom 
Ltd., 203 F.Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (circumvention of e-book technological pro-
tection measure). 
221. This is so because Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act 
oj'2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, §13301, creating new 
17 U.S.C. § 112(D(2)(B) authorized digitization of analog copies when the "digital ver-
sion that is available to the institution is subject to technological protection measures." 
222. See for example US. u. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp., 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). ("However, it is already unlawful to infringe, yet piracy of intellectual property 
has reached epidemic proportions."). See also Victoria Slind-Flor, Students Plunk IP 
Rights 101, The Natl. L .• T. B6 (Mar. 13, 2000) 
223. Green, D. W. (1993), Copyright Law and Policy Meet the Curriculum: Teach-
ers' Understanding, Attitudes, and Practices, ERIC Doc. # ED 364 946 (1993); R.L. 
Rice, Behavior Opinions and Perceptions of Alabama Public School Teachers and Prin-
cipals Regarding the Unauthorized Copying and Use of Microcomputer Software, ERIC 
Doc.# ED 340 703 (1991). 
224. A final related section of TEACH requires the PTO, within six months of en-
actment, to report public comment about the technical!industry standards available for 
protecting "digitized copyrighted works." This is the Congress' consistent trend for re-
quiring input from administrative agencies. 
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distance education proviSIOns of the copyright law. 
Understanding the practical operation of TEACH is important 
for any institution that hopes to negotiate its use provisions 
and compliance requirements. TEACH contains many 
requirements and thus complicates the rather simple operation 
of existing, albeit inadequate, copyright law as it functions in 
distance education settings. 
